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This dissertation focuses on the supply side of healthcare, using the specific case of 
kidney donation and transplantation to address three research questions. In the first chapter, I test 
whether kidney transplant candidates with better access to publicly available kidneys from 
deceased donors are less likely to opt for living kidney donation, or the “private supply.” 
Identification comes from a discontinuous increase in the probability of receiving a publicly 
available kidney generated by the results of a blood test. I find that patients with better access to 
the public supply of kidneys are less likely to opt for living donation. The results indicate that 
policies aimed at increasing the number deceased donors will result in less than full crowd-out of 
living donation. 
The second chapter examines the well-documented association between procedural 
volume and patient outcomes in the context of kidney transplantation. In particular, I test 
whether a volume effect exists in kidney transplantation, which would be consistent with the 
“practice makes perfect” hypothesis. Identification of the volume effect comes from plausibly 
exogenous supply shocks of kidneys within a year at a transplant center. The empirical results 
suggest that much of the observed volume-outcome relationship in kidney transplantation is due 
to between hospital differences in unobserved characteristics that are correlated with both 
transplant volume and patient outcomes. Concentration of transplants at higher volume transplant 
centers may reduce rates of short term patient mortality, but these gains would need to be 
 carefully weighed against any reductions in patient access to care that would result from 
regionalization of care.   
The last chapter examines whether transplant centers experience “forgetting” during 
temporal breaks between kidney transplants. Identification relies on the randomness of arrivals 
of transplantable kidneys at transplant centers, which would create plausibly exogenous variation 
in the size of temporal breaks between transplants at a given transplant center. In addition, I test 
whether the level of experience immediately before a temporal break mitigates any deleterious 
effects that arise from the break. The estimated results suggest that there is little relationship 
between temporal breaks and transplant center productivity, as measured by the outcomes of 
patients transplanted immediately following a break in transplant activity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Does the Public Provision of Kidneys Crowd Out Living Kidney Donation? A Regression 
Discontinuity Analysis 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The interaction of the public and private sectors in the provision of a good has received 
considerable interest from economists and public policy officials. For example, at the core of the 
ongoing health care debate in the United States is the appropriate role of the public sector in 
providing health care. Some argue that near universal coverage provided or subsidized by the 
federal government will simply crowd out private insurance for millions of Americans. Evidence 
from the economics literature supports this claim; expansions of public insurance programs have 
resulted in sizeable crowd out of private insurance (Cutler and Gruber 1996). In countries with 
universal coverage, however, private markets serve as effective substitutes or supplements for 
the public option (Besley, Hall, and Preston 1999 ; Gouveia 1997). In these countries, the private 
market allows individuals to circumvent waiting lists for care, and perhaps purchase a higher 
quality product.  
In this paper, I explore the interaction of the public sector and the private sector in the 
supply of transplantable kidneys. The private supply  is made up of kidneys that are donated to 
patients by living donors who are members of a patients’ social network (family members or 
friends). The public supply comes from kidneys that are recovered from deceased donors and 
made available to patients registered on a transplant waitlist. From the patient’s perspective, the 
key characteristic that distinguishes the two sources of supply is that a kidney from a living 
donor necessarily comes from someone within the patient’s social network, whereas a kidney 
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from the public supply comes from an anonymous, deceased donor. While living donation results 
in better clinical outcomes and lower medical costs for the patient, it imposes financial and 
psychic costs on the patient and members of her social network. For example, living donors are 
not reimbursed for lost wages as a result of making the donation. In addition, the patient may 
incur search costs when trying to identify a potential living donor. Finally, the patient’s social 
network may take on bargaining costs when deciding which individual will end up making the 
donation. 
 Theoretically, improving access to the pool of publicly available kidneys (kidneys from 
anonymous, deceased donors) should crowd out living donation and thus the private supply of 
kidneys. From the patient’s perspective, a kidney from a deceased donor is less costly than a 
kidney from a living donor, since it does not carry with it the financial and psychic costs 
described above. Therefore, one might expect that every patient would opt for a publicly 
available kidney (i.e. “full” crowd-out). In reality, however, there are also costs associated with 
opting for a publicly available kidney. The median waiting time for a publicly available kidney is 
over 3 years in the United States due to excess demand. Most patients waiting for publicly 
provided kidney are on dialysis, which can reduce quality of life (Knoll and Nichol 2003). In 
addition, there is a non-trivial chance of death while waiting for a transplant; in 2009, 
approximately 5,000 patients died while on the waitlist for a publicly available kidney, and 
another 2,000 were removed from the waitlist because they became too sick to be considered a 
good transplant candidate.1  
In this paper, I empirically test the hypothesis that patients with better access to the pool 
of publicly available kidneys will be less likely to opt for living donation. Identifying this crowd-
                                                 
1 Data taken from Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) data website, available here: 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ 
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out effect is challenging because there are many factors that influence whether a patient receives 
a kidney from a living donor that are unobserved to the researcher. I overcome these challenges 
by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in a patient’s ability to access the pool of publicly 
available kidneys. Patients are required to submit blood samples for testing when they register at 
a transplant center. Patients with a high enough score on a particular blood test are given priority 
access to the pool of publicly available kidneys. This special consideration is awarded in a 
discontinuous manner; only patients whose blood test score exceeds a particular cutoff have 
extra points added to their waitlist ranking. Therefore, relative to patients just below the blood 
test score cutoff, patients just above the cutoff have better access to the pool of publicly available 
kidneys. Consistent with the crowd-out hypothesis, patients just above the cutoff are 4.1 to 4.4 
percentage points less likely to receive a privately supplied kidney from a living donor, as 
compared patients just below the cutoff. Tests of the identifying assumptions indicate that this 
estimation strategy yields an unbiased, reduced-form estimate of the crowd-out of living 
donation. Specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in the expected probability of receiving a 
publicly available kidney from the waitlist is predicted to reduce the probability that a patient 
will opt for living donation by 2.6 to 3.4 percentage points. 
 The implication of these findings is that policies aimed at increasing the number of 
publicly available kidneys will result in some crowd-out of living donation, although the crowd-
out effect would be relatively small. This is a notable finding for two reasons. First, living 
donation is the most cost-effective treatment option for patients with kidney failure (Mullins et 
al. 2003). Second, Medicare is the primary insurer for patients with kidney failure.2 In 2008, 
Medicare spent approximately $23 billion on patients with kidney failure, with $4.9 billion paid 
                                                 
2 Any person with kidney failure is entitled to Medicare benefits. For patients with a source of insurance at the time 
of diagnosis, Medicare serves as the secondary insurer for the first 30 months of treatment. After 30 months, 
Medicare becomes the primary insurer. 
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for dialysis treatments (USRDS 2010). Therefore, from a societal point of view, crowd-out of 
living donation is troubling because it leads to increased Medicare expenditures as patients opt 
out of the cost-effective treatment (living donation) and decide to wait (on dialysis) for a kidney 
from the public supply to become available. However, the results presented here suggest that the 
crowd-out effect is small in magnitude, so that any policies aimed at increasing the number of 
deceased donor kidneys would be welfare improving, since they would likely create a net 
increase in the number of transplants performed, and thus the number of lives saved.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
kidney transplantation options available for patients, as well as the kidney allocation process in 
the United States. The third section sketches a conceptual framework that describes how the 
public provision of kidneys can crowd out the private supply of kidneys from living donors. I 
then describe the empirical strategy and the regression discontinuity design. The fifth section 
discusses the data used for estimation, and is followed by the empirical results. I then present the 
results from specification tests and tests of the identifying assumptions. The final section 
discusses the findings.  
 
1.2 Kidney Transplantation in the United States 
Patients in kidney failure have two treatment options available to them: dialysis, in which 
the blood is mechanically cleansed of impurities, and transplantation, in which a kidney from 
another person (either deceased or living) is surgically transplanted into the patient. Dialysis is 
not considered a long-term solution, because lengthened time on dialysis is correlated with 
progressive cardiovascular disease (Goodman and Danovitch 2005) and a lower quality of life 
for the patient while on dialysis: the typical dialysis regimen requires the patient to go to a 
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dialysis center 3 times a week for at least an hour at a time. In addition, dialysis has been shown 
to generate higher long-run financial costs, as compared to transplantation (Mullins et al. 2003). 
Transplantable kidneys come from either deceased donors (the public supply) or from 
living donors (the private supply). With living donor kidney transplantation, a kidney from 
another living individual (usually a family member) is removed laparoscopically and 
transplanted immediately into the patient. The recovery time for the donor is typically 4 weeks, 
although it varies by individual. The donor’s medical costs are paid by the patient’s insurer. 
However, lost wages, lost home production, and travel costs are not reimbursed by insurers. The 
long-term prognosis for living donors is generally good, although there is some evidence that 
living donors are more likely to develop hypertension than non-donors (Davis 2009). In 2009, 
38% of kidney transplants were performed using kidneys from living donors, and most living 
donors were biologically related to the patient.3 
The supply of publicly available kidneys stems from deceased individuals who indicated 
a willingness to donate their organs after death. Organ donors have usually suffered some kind of 
trauma or stroke that has left them “brain dead.” Organ procurement officials help coordinate the 
organ donation process, from obtaining consent from the deceased individual’s family to procure 
the organs, to collecting data about the donor such as age, race, height, weight, circumstance of 
death, etc. Blood and tissue samples are collected and analyzed so that the donor’s blood and 
antigen profiles can be entered into a central database. This data is fed into a computer algorithm 
to produce a list of potential transplant candidates for a particular kidney.   
Kidneys recovered from deceased donors are allocated regionally. There are 58 organ 
procurement organizations (OPOs) that are assigned local service areas. Each OPO has at least 
                                                 
3 Based on author’s calculations using Organ Procurement and Transplantation (OPTN) data found here: 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ 
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one kidney transplant center in its service area. When kidneys are recovered from a deceased 
donor in a particular OPO service area, they are first offered to patients that are registered at 
transplant programs in that same OPO. Therefore, the supply of publicly available kidneys varies 
geographically, depending on the number of brain deaths that have occurred in the local area, 
and the number of families that consent to organ donation. 
Each time a kidney is recovered from a deceased donor, a computer algorithm calculates 
a waitlist score for local patients on the waitlist who have a blood type that is compatible with 
the donor. The patient with the highest score will be offered the kidney first. If the patient (or 
more accurately, her physician) turns down the offer, then the kidney is offered to the patient 
with the next highest score. The length of time that a patient has been on the waitlist is the major 
component of the waitlist score. That is, patients with the longest wait times have the highest 
waitlist scores. Points can also be awarded based on the level of the immunological match to the 
recovered kidney, but this aspect of the allocation system has been de-emphasized because 
advancements in immunosuppressive treatments have made immunological matching less of a 
priority. 
The policy also gives certain patient populations special consideration for deceased donor 
kidneys. For example, because kidney function is vital in the development of children (Al-Akash 
and Ettenger 2005), pediatric patients (age less than 18) receive extra points on their waitlist 
score, and recently have been given priority access to higher quality organs from deceased 
donors age 35 younger at time of death (the so-called “Share 35” policy, enacted in 2005). 
Another group of patients that receives special consideration are “sensitized” patients. A 
sensitized patient is one whose body has heightened levels of antibodies that will react against 
the antigens present on the cell surfaces of the transplanted kidney, which makes the patient’s 
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body more likely to reject the kidney. Common "sensitizing events" are childbirth, previous 
organ transplant, and receipt of a blood transfusion. The degree of sensitization is measured by 
the patient’s panel reactive antibody (PRA) score. This score, which ranges from 0 to 100, is a 
rough measure of the likelihood that the patient’s body will reject a kidney from the local donor 
pool. For example, a patient with a PRA score of 40 would be projected to reject 40% of the 
kidneys from the local donor pool because of her underlying antibody profile. When a deceased 
donor kidney becomes available, potential recipients must pass a "crossmatch" test, which tests 
whether the patient’s immune system is likely to react against that particular kidney. Sensitized 
patients are more likely to fail this test because of their underlying antibody profile, and therefore 
can wait an extended period of time for a compatible deceased donor kidney to become 
available.  
Recognizing that sensitized patients have a disadvantage in accessing the pool of publicly 
available kidneys, the allocation policy gives these patients priority access to a kidney they are 
compatible with (i.e. if the patient passes the crossmatch test) in the form of 4 extra points on 
their waitlist score. However, a patient can only qualify for the extra points if her PRA score is 
80 or higher. Patients with a PRA score below 80 are not eligible for the extra waitlist points, 
even though they might be just as sensitized as patients with a PRA score just above the cutoff. 
In other words, the policy creates a discontinuous increase in the probability of receiving a 
publicly available kidney; patients with a PRA score just above the cutoff are more likely to 
receive a kidney from the waitlist than patients just below the PRA cutoff. This variation in the 
ability to access the pool of publicly available kidneys will serve as my identification strategy, 
which is discussed in more detail below.  
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1.3 Conceptual Framework  
 Consider a patient that is in kidney failure and in need of a kidney transplant, and her 
social network that is made up of individuals that are “emotionally related” to the patient. These 
individuals derive utility from the patient’s health and well-being. Since each member of the 
patient’s social network derives utility from the health of the patient, they will achieve higher 
utility if the patient receives a transplant.4 If no one within the patient’s social network donates a 
kidney, then it is assumed that the patient will wait for a publicly available kidney to become 
available. The expected costs and expected benefits associated with the two transplantation 
options will determine whether the patient receives a kidney from a living donor.  
 If the social network supplies a kidney to the patient privately, then the benefits of the 
improved health of the patient are realized immediately by everyone in the patient’s social 
network. The transplant can be scheduled and performed as soon as a day is found that is 
convenient for the patient, the donor, and the surgical team. In other words, the patient receives a 
new kidney with certainty, and her health is improved immediately (i.e. there is virtually no 
waiting). Because each member of the social network derives utility from the improved health of 
the patient, each member of the social network realizes a higher level of utility immediately and 
with certainty. In contrast, there is no guarantee that the patient will ever be offered a publicly 
available kidney while on the waitlist. In addition, even if the patient receives a kidney from the 
waitlist, the median waiting time for a kidney in the United States in over 3 years. While the 
patient waits on the waitlist, her condition could worsen, and this deterioration in the patient’s 
health would lower the utility level of the patient and the utility of the members of her social 
                                                 
4 In this sense, the demand for a transplantable kidney is a derived demand, as it is a key input into the production of 
health for the patient. That is, the patient and her social network derive utility from the health of the patient, and not 
directly from the kidney itself. 
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network. The impact of this waiting period on the decision to opt for living donation depends on 
the time preferences of the patient and the members of her social network.  
 Despite the benefits of living kidney transplantation, there are important costs associated 
with relying on the private supply of kidneys that must be considered. These costs are borne 
privately by the patient and her social network, and can take on different forms. First, the risk of 
complication or death that the living donor will be exposed to as a result of making the donation 
can be considered a transaction cost; the exchange cannot be made without the surgery, and thus 
without exposure to these risks. While the mortality and complication rates for living donors are 
low, patients and potential donors may over-estimate these risks, and may also have differing 
levels of willingness to accept risk (Young et al 2008). In addition, the donor may incur out of 
pocket financial costs, such as lost wages and travel expenses. There is also some evidence that 
living donors have difficulty obtaining life insurance after donation, or may pay higher premiums 
for coverage (Yang et al. 2007).    
 Going inside the “black box” of the decision process of the patient and her social 
network, there are additional costs that are associated with identifying and selecting a potential 
living donor. First, the patient may incur search costs – which are likely to be psychological in 
nature - associated with recruiting potential living donors. Patients can be reluctant to ask a 
member of their social network for a kidney out of concern for the donor’s health and well-being 
(Pradel et al 2003). Second, there may be bargaining costs within the social network in terms of 
identifying who becomes the living donor. The health of the patient can be viewed as a public 
good, so members of the patient’s social network may attempt to “free-ride”. There is evidence 
that families do strategize when considering living donation. For example, one Canadian study 
found that wives are more likely to donate to their husbands, but that husbands are less likely to 
9 
 
donate to their wives. This disparity can be explained in the context of a family bargaining 
framework: if the husband is the primary earner, then the opportunity cost of his time associated 
with making a living donation may be relatively large. Therefore, for a female patient, the family 
may collectively decide that the patient’s husband should not be the donor, since the donation 
process could result in a disruption of income or consumption for the family (Zimmerman et al. 
2000).   
 A publicly supplied kidney represents a less costly treatment option for a patient and her 
social network because it does not carry with it the costs discussed above, as these kidneys are 
from anonymous donors. The hypothesis of this paper is that patients with a relatively high 
probability of receiving a publicly provided kidney will be less likely to receive a privately 
supplied kidney from a living donor, all else equal. There is one study in the economics literature 
that examines this issue. Howard (forthcoming) uses geographic variation in the supply and 
demand of deceased donor kidneys to identify the substitutability of living and deceased kidney 
donation. He finds that patients with a higher predicted wait time for a deceased donor kidney 
are more likely to opt for living donor kidney transplantation. His results are consistent with the 
hypothesis put forth here, as well as with the empirical results of this paper, although motivated 
and identified in different ways.   
 The framework discussed here highlights the potential difficulty in empirically 
identifying the effect of having differentially better access to the pool of publicly available 
kidneys on the probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor. There are many 
factors that go into the decision-making process that are unobserved to the researcher, like the 
size of a patient’s social network, the value that the members of the social network place on the 
improved health of the patient, the willingness of the patient to accept a kidney from a member 
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of her social network, etc. In some respect, it is unlikely that any of these unobserved factors are 
correlated with the ability of the patient to receive a publicly available kidney. But there are 
other factors, like the income level of the patient, that are unobserved and could be correlated 
with the expected probability of receiving a publicly provided kidney. Higher income patients 
can more easily afford to pay multiple registration fees and they may register at multiple 
transplant centers to increase the likelihood of receiving a kidney from a deceased donor. If 
higher income patients (and their social networks) have systematically different preferences for 
living donation, then omitting income from an estimating equation could lead to bias in the 
estimated regression coefficients.  
 
1.4 Identification Strategy and Estimation  
 In order to identify the causal crowd-out effect, I exploit a discontinuous change in 
patients’ ability to access the pool of publicly available kidneys created by the kidney allocation 
policy. As described earlier, patients with a PRA score of 80 or higher receive 4 extra points on 
their waitlist score if they are an acceptable match to a deceased donor kidney. Therefore, 
relative to patients with a PRA score just below 80, patients just above are more likely to receive 
a publicly available kidney from the waitlist. Therefore, the treatment of interest – the ability to 
access the pool of publicly available kidneys – changes discontinuously at the PRA cutoff of 80. 
If having improved access to the pool of publicly available kidneys creates a disincentive for 
patients and their social networks to opt for living donation, then there will exist a discontinuous 
decrease in the probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor at the PRA cutoff.  
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 To test this, I first specify a first-stage equation that estimates the discontinuous change 
(increase) in the probability that a patient receives a publicly available deceased donor kidney 
that occurs at the PRA cutoff. In particular, I fit a model given by: 
 
(1.1) 2 20 1 1 180 80 ( )( ) (1 80 ) ( )( )
q q
i i i Rq i i Lqq q
DDT PRA PRA PRA PRA PRAi iπ π π π= == + + + − +∑ ∑ ν  
 
In equation (1.1),  denotes the probability that patient i will receive a publicly available 
kidney from the waitlist, equals one if the patient’s PRA value is 80 or higher, and  
is the patient’s PRA value. Following the literature (Lee and Lemieux 2009), I estimate equation 
(1.1) using a global polynomial approach, and I use a quadratic in PRA score to flexibly estimate 
the underlying trend in the conditional expectation that a patient will receive a kidney from the 
waitlist.
iDDT
80iPRA iPRA
5 The estimated coefficient l1π  captures the discontinuous increase in the probability of 
receiving a publicly available kidney at the PRA cutoff. Estimation of the first-stage equation is 
meant to demonstrate the expected probability that a patient receives a publicly available kidney 
if she opts against living donation.  
Next, I estimate a reduced-form equation that estimates the discontinuity in the 
probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor: 
 
(1.2) 2 20 1 1 180 80 ( )( ) (1 80 ) ( )( )
q q
i i i Rq i i Lq iq q
LDKT PRA PRA PRA PRA PRA iγ γ γ γ= == + + + − +∑ ∑ ε
                                                
 
 
 
5 Based on the Schwarz criterion, the quadratic specification was selected over other models that included between 
one and nine polynomial terms. 
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Strictly speaking, the estimated coefficient l1γ captures the treatment effect of having a PRA 
value at or above the cutoff of 80 on the probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living 
donor. Taking the ratio
l
l
1
1
γ
π  yields an estimate of the local average treatment effect of increasing 
the probability of receiving a publicly available kidney on the probability of receiving a kidney 
that was supplied privately from a living donor. If the crowd-out hypothesis is true, then l1γ  
should be negative, as should 
l
l
1
1
γ
π . I estimate equations (1.1) and (1.2) using a linear probability 
model, and cluster standard errors at each PRA value to account for heteroskedasticity 
introduced by specification error.  I estimate 
l
l
1
1
γ
π  using indirect least squares (ILS) and bootstrap 
the standard error of the ratio.  
 The identifying assumption is that patients in the immediate neighborhood of the PRA 
cutoff value are alike, on average, in all ways that affect the probability that they will receive a 
kidney from a living donor, except for the fact that patients just above the cutoff have a greater 
ability to access the pool of publicly available kidneys, relative to patients just below. I partially 
test this assumption by showing that observable characteristics of patients do not appear to 
change in a discontinuous manner at the cutoff. Note that this does not rule the possibility that 
patients on either side of the cutoff are different, on average, along dimensions that are 
unobservable to the researcher. These unobservable characteristics might include size of the 
patient’s social network, the levels of altruism of potential donors and the patient, and the 
income level of patients and members of their social networks. In the current setting, however, it 
seems unlikely that these types of unobservable characteristics that also affect the probability of 
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receiving a kidney from a living donor would also be changing discontinuously at the cutoff. A 
patient’s PRA score is the result of a laboratory blood test, which is presumably difficult to 
manipulate. Also, the PRA cutoff value of 80 has been described by some in the transplant 
community as being “arbitrary” and “artificial”, which implies that, from a medical point of 
view, there is nothing significant about a PRA value of exactly eighty.6 Therefore, it is likely that 
patients on either side of the cutoff are alike, on average, in all ways that affect the probability 
that they will receive a kidney from a living donor, except that patients just above the cutoff have 
relatively better access to the pool of publicly available kidneys. Nonetheless, I estimate 
equations (1.1) and (1.2) with and without individual level covariates to indirectly test the 
validity of the identifying assumptions. I also provide additional tests of the identifying 
assumptions later in the paper.   
 One challenge from using the global polynomial approach to estimate equations (1.1) and 
(1.2) is that the distribution of observations is heavily skewed at the lower end of the PRA 
distribution: over 70 percent of observations in the data have a PRA between 0 and 5. Any 
regression will try to best fit the data at this cluster in order to minimize squared errors. 
Therefore, the fitted regression line in other ranges of the PRA score, particularly near the PRA 
cutoff of 80, may actually reflect variation in the conditional expectation of LDKT at the cluster 
at the lower end of the PRA distribution, rather than the variation in LDKT in the neighborhood 
of the PRA cutoff. In order to avoid this problem, I estimate the regressions using a sub-sample 
of observations with a PRA of 6 or higher.7 While this strategy eliminates a large number of 
                                                 
6 These comments were made during the proposition and subsequent period of public comment of the new kidney 
allocation policy. Available here (2 links): 
http://www.unos.org/SharedContentDocuments/KidneyAllocationSlides_Reduced.pdf 
http://www.unos.org/SharedContentDocuments/KidneyAllocationSystem--RequestForInformation.pdf 
7 The empirical results are robust against using different ranges of PRA values to estimate the discontinuities; these 
results are presented later in the paper.  
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observations, it reduces the bias that may be created by including them in the estimation sample. 
In addition, the remaining estimation sample has a sufficient number of observations in the local 
area of the PRA cutoff to yield precisely estimated coefficients.  
 
1.5 Data and Sample Construction 
To fit equations (1.1) and (1.2), I use data from the United Network of Organ Sharing 
(UNOS) Standard Transplant Analysis and Research Files (STAR) on all kidney waitlist activity 
as of August 2008. These data include additions to the waitlist (new waitlist registrations) or 
removals from the waitlist, which can result from transplant, patient death, or if the patient is too 
ill to be considered a viable transplant recipient. The dataset includes detailed information on 
transplant candidates collected at the time of registration on the kidney waitlist, information 
about the transplant procedure (if a transplant is performed), and follow up information on the 
patient’s outcomes after the transplant (again, if a transplant is performed).   
 For each patient that registers on the waitlist, two measures of PRA are collected and 
recorded: current PRA, and peak PRA. The current PRA refers to the patient’s most recent PRA 
score while on the waitlist. The peak PRA score refers to the patient’s highest ever value of her 
PRA score. Either score can be used for the purposes of calculating the patient’s waitlist score, 
and the choice of which PRA value to use is made by each transplant center. Also included in the 
dataset is a variable that indicates which PRA score – current or peak – is used in the calculation 
of each patient’s waitlist score. Using these three variables, I formulate the relevant PRA score 
that is used for each transplant candidate. This constructed PRA score serves as the running 
variable in the regression discontinuity estimation. 
15 
 
The data captures a patient’s position in the PRA distribution at a particular point in time, 
but does not report the entire history of laboratory results. One concern is that once a patient is 
listed on the waitlist, she may experience a “sensitizing” event that would increase her PRA 
score (and in particular, place her above the PRA cutoff of 80). For example, the patient may 
start off below the cutoff (and be ineligible for the extra waitlist points), but is then captured in 
the data above the cutoff because she has experienced a sensitizing event that has increased her 
level of sensitization. In this case, the running variable in the regression discontinuity design is 
itself changing, which would mean that patients could potentially be eligible for the extra waitlist 
points at some points in time, but not at others. It also raises the concern that patients may 
intentionally expose themselves to sensitizing events to move themselves up the PRA 
distribution, and possibly qualify for the extra waitlist points.   
The three most common sensitizing events are pregnancy, previous transplant, and blood 
transfusions. In the current context, it is unlikely that patients in the data sample are experiencing 
these events. Women with kidney failure are less likely to become pregnant because they often 
have irregular menstruation. In addition, because a pregnancy would greatly increase the risk of 
high blood pressure for both the mother and the baby, women are strongly discouraged from 
trying to become pregnant until after they receive a transplant. Therefore, it is unlikely that any 
women in the estimation sample are becoming pregnant (and potentially more sensitized) after 
registering on the waitlist. I exclude any patients that have had a previous transplant, and also 
exclude patients who are simultaneously listed for another organ transplant. Therefore, no 
patients in the sample should experience sensitization because of receipt of a non-kidney 
transplant. Finally, patients with kidney failure also often suffer from anemia, a condition that 
was once treated with blood transfusions. However, the advent of the use of epoetin (a synthetic 
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hormone used to stimulate red blood cell creation by the bone marrow) in the mid-1990’s has 
greatly reduced the reliance on blood transfusions as a treatment option for dialysis patients. 
Although I do not directly observe if a patient has received a blood transfusion, I start the sample 
in 1997 to help reduce the chance that patients receive blood transfusions to treat anemia, and 
thus become sensitized after being placed on the waitlist.    
In addition to the above sample restrictions, I also limit the sample to adult patients (at 
least 18 years old) and to patients with non-missing values for the three PRA variables discussed 
above. I exclude patients from Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and Guam. I also drop 
observations in which at least one of the following covariates has a missing value: age at 
registration, gender, race, primary source of insurance, primary diagnosis at registration, blood 
type, date of waitlist registration, and permanent state of residence. In the models, I include 
measures of a patient’s education level, and whether a patient needs assistance with activities of 
daily living (ADLs). Data for these two measures are frequently missing. Rather than drop 
observations with missing information on education or assistance with ADLs, I create dummy 
variables that indicate whether an observation has a missing value for these two characteristics. 
The dependent variable in equation (1.1) is an indicator for whether a patient receives a publicly 
supplied kidney from the waitlist. The dependent variable for equation (1.2) is an indicator for 
whether a patient receives a privately supplied kidney from a living donor.  
The sample restrictions described above yield a sample of 145,159 patients who 
registered on the waitlist between 1997 and 2006. The final estimation sample includes 39,111 
patients who have a PRA score of 6 or higher. It is important to note that the sample does not 
include any individual that received a living donor transplant without also registering on the 
waitlist. This is because PRA (the running variable in the regression discontinuity design) is only 
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observed for patients that are on the waitlist. Over the time period studied here, roughly two-
thirds of recipients of a living donor kidney were also registered on the waitlist.8 For the 
remaining one-third of living donor kidney recipients, I do observe some patient characteristics 
like age, race, gender, and source of insurance, which are measured at the time of the transplant. 
However, PRA is largely uncorrelated with many patient characteristics, so it is difficult to use 
the characteristics of these patients to project where they would lie in the PRA distribution if they 
were in the estimation sample. The only observable characteristic that is strongly correlated with 
PRA is gender: because pregnancy is one of the main sources of sensitization, patients in the 
neighborhood of the PRA cutoff are predominantly female. In particular, females make up 77 
percent of the estimation sample with PRA values between 75 and 85. Based on the data that is 
collected at the transplant, living donor recipients who do not register on the waitlist are more 
likely to be male; only 41 percent of living donor kidney recipients who did not register on the 
waitlist are women. Therefore, at least along one dimension, it appears that if these missing 
living donor kidney recipients were in the estimation sample, they would be more likely to be 
from the lower end of the PRA distribution. In other words, this limited evidence suggests that 
the living donor recipients that are missing from the estimation sample are not differentially 
more likely to have PRA values that are in the neighborhood of 80. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Based on author’s calculations using Organ Procurement and Transplantation (OPTN) data found here: 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/. Many transplant centers will place patients on the waitlist, even if the patient 
has indicated that she will opt for living donor kidney transplantation. The rationale for listing these patients is that it 
creates an “insurance policy” in the event that the living donor backs out of the surgery.  
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1.6 Results 
Table 1.1 reports the sample means of patient characteristics, and compares average 
characteristics of patients that receive a kidney from a living donor (“LDK Recipients” in the 
table) against those that do not.9 Clearly, there are many factors that are correlated with the 
probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor, namely age, race, education, and 
insurance status. There are also statistically significant differences in the primary diagnosis and 
blood types between living donor kidney recipients and non-recipients. In addition, there are 
secular trends in the probability that patients receive kidneys from living donors. These 
differences in observable characteristics underscore the challenge of empirically identifying the 
causal effect of having improved access to the pool of publicly available kidneys on the 
probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor. Simply controlling for these 
characteristics in a regression will not address the likelihood that living donor kidney recipients 
(and their social networks) are different, on average, than non-recipients along unobserved 
dimensions.   
First I present the graphical evidence that underlies the identification strategy discussed 
above. Figure 1.1 plots the unadjusted mean probability of receiving a publicly available kidney 
against the range of PRA values. The probability of receiving a publicly provided kidney from 
the waitlist increases discontinuously at the PRA cutoff of 80; patients just below the PRA cutoff 
have approximately a 25 percent chance of receiving a kidney from the waitlist, while patients 
just above the cutoff have about a 40 percent chance. Therefore, the ability to access the pool of 
publicly available kidneys increases by 60 percent for patients who are just above the PRA 
cutoff, relative to patients just below. Figure 1.2 plots the outcome of interest – the probability  
                                                 
9 The group does not receive a kidney from a living donor  include patients that receive a publicly available kidney, 
as well as patients that do not receive any transplant at all. 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean S.E Mean S.E p-value
Age at Registration (in years) 46.2 0.22 50.1 0.07 0.0
Female 0.586 0.008 0.596 0.003 0.235
Race 
White 0.567 0.008 0.399 0.003 0.000
Black 0.241 0.007 0.387 0.003 0.000
Hispanic 0.132 0.006 0.142 0.002 0.126
Other 0.060 0.004 0.072 0.001 0.006
Education
High school only or less 0.399 0.008 0.498 0.003 0.000
At least some college 0.426 0.008 0.317 0.002 0.000
Missing 0.175 0.006 0.185 0.002 0.121
Primary Insurance
Private 0.593 0.008 0.375 0.003 0.000
Medicare 0.315 0.008 0.506 0.003 0.000
Medicaid 0.066 0.004 0.092 0.002 0.000
Other 0.026 0.003 0.027 0.001 0.787
Functional Status
No Assistance with ADL 0.642 0.008 0.642 0.003 0.991
Some Assistance with ADL 0.028 0.003 0.051 0.001 0.000
Total Assistance with ADL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.087
Missing 0.329 0.008 0.305 0.002 0.003
Blood Type
A 0.328 0.008 0.278 0.002 0.000
B 0.141 0.006 0.155 0.002 0.030
AB 0.032 0.003 0.032 0.001 0.852
O 0.486 0.008 0.523 0.003 0.000
Other 0.013 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.988
Primary Diagnosis 
Diabetes Type 1, Insulin Dependent 0.030 0.003 0.040 0.001 0.006
Diabetes Type 2, Non - Insulin Dependent 0.039 0.003 0.070 0.001 0.000
Diabetes Type 2, Insulin Dependent 0.048 0.004 0.092 0.002 0.000
Hypertensive Nephrosclerosis 0.155 0.006 0.201 0.002 0.000
Polycystic Kidneys 0.102 0.005 0.068 0.001 0.000
Malignant Hypertension 0.029 0.003 0.044 0.001 0.000
Other 0.597 0.008 0.486 0.003 0.000
Year of Waitlist Registration
1997 0.041 0.003 0.070 0.001 0.000
1998 0.069 0.004 0.085 0.001 0.000
1999 0.071 0.004 0.087 0.002 0.000
2000 0.087 0.005 0.093 0.002 0.260
2001 0.087 0.002 0.098 0.002 0.047
2002 0.111 0.005 0.103 0.002 0.151
2003 0.127 0.005 0.109 0.002 0.000
2004 0.142 0.006 0.113 0.002 0.000
2005 0.137 0.006 0.121 0.002 0.004
2006 0.128 0.005 0.121 0.002 0.232
LDK Recipients Non-LDK Recipients
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Figure 1.2 
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that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor – against the PRA score. Consistent with the 
conceptual framework discussed above, there appears to be a break at the PRA cutoff in the trend 
of the conditional expectation that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor. In particular, 
it appears that patients who have better access to the pool of publicly available kidneys are less 
likely to receive a privately supplied kidney from a living donor. Visually, this discontinuous 
decrease appears to be small in magnitude, but note that the overall rate of living donor 
transplantation is also relatively low in the neighborhood of the cutoff. 
Table 1.2 reports the estimated values of 1π  and 1γ , which measure the discontinuity in 
the probability of receiving a kidney from the public supply, and the discontinuity in the 
probability of receiving a kidney from a living donor, respectively. Panel A shows that the 
expected probability of receiving a publicly provided kidney increases by 13 to 16 percentage 
points for patients just above the PRA cutoff. For patients just below the PRA cutoff (with PRA 
values between 75 and 79), the unadjusted expected probability of receiving a kidney from the 
waitlist is 24.1 percent. Therefore, having a PRA value just above the cutoff increases the 
probability that a patient can access the pool of publicly available kidneys by 54 to 66 percent.  
Panel B of Table 1.2 shows that the probability that patients just above the PRA cutoff receive a 
kidney from a living donor decreases by 4.1 to 4.4 percentage points, on average. On a base of 
8.7 percentage points, this decrease represents a 47 to 50 percent reduction in the probability of 
living donor transplantation, as compared to patients just below the cutoff. Therefore, having 
improved access to the pool of publicly available kidneys appears to create a disincentive for 
patients to opt for living donation. Panel B also shows that there are some individual 
characteristics that are strong predictors of whether a patient will receive a kidney from a living 
donor. In particular, older patients, non-white patients, and less educated patients are less likely 
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Table 1.2: Discontinuity Estimates 
Panel A: Probability of Receiving Deceased Donor Kidney (first-stage)
Discontinuity Estimate 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.129***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Polynomial Order 2nd 2nd 2nd
Individual Characteristics Included? N Y Y
Year Dummies Included? N N Y
Transplant Center Dummies Included? N N Y
Number of Observations 35,371 35,371 35,371
Panel B: Probability of Receiving a Kidney from a Living Donor (reduced-form)
Discontinuity Estimate -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Age at Registration (in years) -.002*** -.002***
(.000) (.000)
Female .019*** .022***
(.003) (.004)
Race (White  omitted):
Black -.060*** -.061***
(.005) (.005)
Hispanic -.024*** -.013**
(.004) (.005)
Other -.045*** -.041***
(.008) (.008)
Education (HS or less omitted):
At least some college .027*** .026***
(.003) (.003)
Missing -.005 .005
(.007) (.004)
Primary Insurance (Private  omitted):
Medicare -.059*** -.052***
(.004) (.004)
Medicaid -.061*** -.058***
(.006) (.006)
Other -.037*** -.043***
(.011) (.012)  
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  Table 1.2: Discontinuity Estimates (continued) 
Functional Status (No Assistance omitted)
Some Assistance with ADL -.021*** -.015**
(.006) (.006)
Total Assistance with ADL .005 .008
(.037) (.037)
Missing -.001 .005
(.003) (.006)
Blood Type (Type O  omitted):
A .013*** .011**
(.004) (.004)
B .007** .007**
(.003) (.003)
AB .007 .003
(.008) (.008)
Primary Diagnosis (Other Diagnosis omitted):
Diabetes Type 1, Insulin Dependent -.050*** -.047***
(.007) (.007)
Diabetes Type 2, Non - Insulin Dependent -.030*** -.032***
(.006) (.006)
Diabetes Type 2, Insulin Dependent -.034*** -.033***
(.005) (.005)
Hypertensive Nephrosclerosis -.010*** -.008**
(.004) (.004)
Polycystic Kidneys .001 .003
(.007) (.007)
Malignant Hypertension -.023** -.020**
(.007) (.008)
Polynomial Order 2nd 2nd 2nd
Individual Characteristics Included? N Y Y
Year Dummies Included? N N Y
Transplant Center Dummies Included? N N Y
Number of Observations 39,111 39,111 39,111
Notes:
1. The number of observations used in the first-stage regression (Panel A) is lower than 
the number of observations used in the reduced-form equation because it is limited to 
patients that do not receive a kidney from a living donor. That is, the estimates in Panel A
reflect the discontinuous increase in the probability of receiving a kidney from the waitlist
if they forgo LDKT
2. Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses (clustered at PRA level)
3. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1  
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to receive a kidney from a living donor. Privately insured patients are more likely to receive a 
kidney from a living donor, as compared to patients with other sources of insurance (Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other).  
Panel B of Table 1.2 also provides an indirect test of the identifying assumptions 
discussed earlier. In columns 2 and 3 of the table, individual characteristics are included in the 
estimating equations. Yet when these characteristics are omitted from the analysis (as in the 
specification presented in column 1), the point estimate of the discontinuity remains virtually 
unchanged. In other words, even though many individual characteristics are strongly correlated 
with the probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor, because these factors are 
not changing discontinuously at the PRA cutoff, their exclusion from the specification in column 
1 does not seem to result in omitted variables bias. 
Table 1.3 presents the estimate of 1
1
γ
π , which is the indirect least squares (ILS) estimate 
of the effect of increasing the probability of receiving a publicly provided kidney on the 
probability that a patient will receive a privately supplied kidney from a living donor. The 
estimates suggest that if the probability of receiving a publicly provided kidney increases from 0 
to 100 percent, the probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor decreases by 
26 to 34 percentage points. A more intuitive interpretation is that a 10 percentage point increase 
in the probability of accessing the pool of publicly available kidneys would decrease the 
likelihood that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor by 2.6 to 3.4 percentage points. 
In regards to the crowd-out hypothesis, these estimates imply that there exists an element of 
crowd-out of living kidney donation, but that the crowd-out is less than full. Therefore, policies 
aimed at increasing the pool of publicly available kidneys may have the unintended consequence  
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Table 1.3: Indirect Least Squares Estimates 
Probability of Receiving Deceased Donor Kidney (first-stage) 0.159 0.143 0.129
Probability of Receiving Kidney from Living Donor (reduced-form) -0.041 -0.044 -0.043
ILS Estimate (reduced-form / first-stage) -0.259*** -0.306*** -0.335***
(0.069) (0.075) (0.084)
Individual Characteristics Included? N Y Y
Year Dummies Included? N N Y
Transplant Center Dummies Included? N N Y
Notes:
1. Bootstrapped Standard Errors appear in parentheses
2. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1  
of crowding out some living kidney donation, but such a policy would yield a net increase in the 
number of total kidney transplants performed. 
 
1.7 Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design and Robustness Checks 
 The results in Table 1.2 provide indirect support of the identifying assumptions of the 
regression discontinuity design. In order to provide more direct evidence, I estimate the 
following equation: 
(1.3) '0 1i iLDKT PRA Xi iβ β φ= + + +ξ   
This equation is analogous to equation (1.2), except that PRA only enters linearly in equation 
(1.3), and includes patient characteristics (captured in the vector iX ).
10 I estimate equation (1.3), 
and then calculate the predicted value of  (denoted by iLDKT niKTLD ) for each observation. I 
then plot the conditional expectation of niLDKT  against PRA values. If any patient characteristics 
are changing discontinuously at the PRA cutoff, then the there will be a break in the conditional 
                                                 
10 In other words, equation (1.3) is the version of equation (1.2) without the quadratic term in PRA, the indicator 
, and without the interaction terms of the indicator variable and linear and quadratic terms of PRA.  80
i
PRA
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expectation of niLDKT
iKT
 at the PRA cutoff.11 If this occurs, then it implies that the identifying 
assumptions do not hold; namely, that patients in the immediate neighborhood are different, on 
average, along observable dimensions that affect the probability that they receive a kidney from 
a living donor. If this is true, then the estimates presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 cannot be 
interpreted as the causal effect of having improved access to the pool of publicly available 
kidneys on the probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor. 
 Figure 1.3 plots the conditional expectation of predicted values of  from 
estimating equation (1.3) against the range of PRA values. Visually, it appears that the predicted 
values of  are trending smoothly through the PRA cutoff; no breaks are visible. This 
implies that observable characteristics are not changing discontinuously at the cutoff. Note that 
this does not rule out the possibility that patients on either side of the cutoff are different, on 
average, along unobserved dimensions. But considering the specific context (i.e. the running 
variable is the result from a laboratory blood test), and the fact that the discontinuity estimates 
are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of covariates, it seems that the identifying 
assumptions are satisfied. 
iLDKT
LD
In order to test the robustness of the empirical results to the choice of PRA range, I re-
estimate equation (1.2) using varying ranges of PRA. Table 1.4 reports the results of this 
analysis. The top left cell reports the discontinuity estimate presented in Panel B of Table 1.2, 
which is estimated using observations with PRA values between 6 and 100. Moving down the 
rows, the lower bound of the PRA range moves closer to the PRA cutoff of 80 (from the left). 
Likewise, moving across the columns (from left to right), the upper bound of the PRA range 
                                                 
11 In this sense, this is like an “omnibus” check of the observable characteristics. One-by-one visual inspection of the 
conditional expectation of the covariates implies that observable characteristics are trending smoothly the PRA 
cutoff. For brevity, these graphs are omitted from the paper, but they are available from the author upon request.   
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Figure 1.3 
 
moves closer to the PRA cutoff (from the right). The point estimates remains strongly 
statistically significant over a wide spectrum of possible PRA ranges used in estimation, and are 
largely similar in magnitude. The estimate reported in the southeast corner of the table results 
from the most restrictive sub-sample; only observations within 5 points of either side of the PRA 
cutoff are used. This point estimate is fairly close to the others reported in the table, although it is 
less precisely estimated.   
 While the sample was constructed to exclude patients that might experience a sensitizing 
event while on the waitlist (and thus a changing PRA score), one concern is that patient PRA 
values change over time, even in the absence of a sensitizing event. This could occur if the 
laboratory test used to calculate PRA generates different PRA scores from month to month 
(perhaps due to random chance). Such random variation would be troubling in the current  
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Table 1.4: Reduced-Form Estimate Using Different PRA Ranges 
100 99 94 89 84
6 -.043*** -.043*** -.042*** -.039*** -.042***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
9 -.038*** -.038*** -.037*** -.034*** -.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
14 -.044*** -.044*** -.043*** -.040*** -.043***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
19 -.041*** -.040*** -.039*** -.036*** -.039***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
24 -.046*** -.046*** -.045*** -.042*** -.044***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
29 -.045*** -.044*** -.044*** -.040*** -.042***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
34 -.044*** -.044*** -.042*** -.039*** -.040***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
39 -.039*** -.039*** -.038*** -.035*** -.037***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
44 -.044*** -.044*** -.043*** -.040*** -.042***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
49 -.044*** -.044*** -.043*** -.040*** -.041***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
54 -.045*** -.045*** -.044*** -.041*** -.043***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
59 -.052*** -.053*** -.051*** -.049*** -.050***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
64 -.045*** -.045*** -.044*** -.041*** -.044***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
69 -.036** -.039*** -.047*** -.050*** -.050***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
74 -.02 -.025 -.034* -.038** -.036*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Notes:
1. Table reports the results of 75 separate regressions, where a different 
range of PRA scores was used in each regression to estimate the discontinuity
in the probability that a patient receives a kidney from a living donor.
2. The estimate in the northwest corner is the previously reported discontinuity
estimate reported in Table 2. 
3. All equations include controls for patient characteristics, registration year  
fixed effects, and transplant center fixed effects
4. All equations use a quadratic of PRA except the ones used to estimate the
discontinuities reported in the last two rows. In these cases, a linear specification 
was used because the conditional expectation of the the dependent variable
appears "locally linear" near the cutoff. 
5. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses.
6. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1
Upper Bound of PRA Range (inclusive)
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context because it would move patients above and below the PRA cutoff, thus giving and then 
removing priority access to the pool of publicly provided kidneys in a random fashion over time. 
I address this concern in two ways. First, I contacted histocompatibility labs to inquire how often 
it happens that a patient can “bounce” around the PRA cutoff. Based on the responses of the labs 
I contacted, it appears that this random variation happens with relatively low frequency. In 
addition, even though patients submit monthly blood samples, their PRA is not necessarily  
calculated every month. The testing procedure is costly, and is not always fully reimbursed, so 
some labs calculate the PRA score much less frequently than once a month. This would limit the 
number of chances for a patient’s PRA score to change over time.   
Empirically, I partially address this concern by examining two sub-samples of patients. 
Recall that the data reports two PRA values: current PRA and peak PRA. First, I eliminate 
patients who show evidence of “straddling” the PRA cutoff; these are patients whose current 
PRA is less than 80, but their peak PRA is 80 or higher. These patients have, at one point in time, 
had a PRA value above the PRA cutoff, but currently do not. That is, they have exhibited exactly 
the variation in PRA that would cause concern in the context of utilizing the regression 
discontinuity design. Among the 39,111 patients in the estimation sample, 4,418 patients (11%) 
have PRA values that “straddle” the cutoff. I exclude these observations and re-estimate equation 
(1.2) on the 34,693 observations that do not “straddle” the PRA cutoff. For the second sub-
sample, I eliminate any patient whose current PRA is not equal to their peak PRA. These are 
patients who have experienced some variation in their PRA scores over time. The remaining 
patients exhibit some “stability” in their PRA values. Among the estimation sample, 13,885 
patients (36%) have “stable” PRA values in that their current and peak PRA take on the same 
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values in the data. This approach is more conservative in that it restricts the analysis to patients 
for whom I do not observe variation in their PRA values in the data.  
 Table 1.5 reports the estimates from re-estimating equation (1.2) using the two sub-
samples. The first row reports the estimates using the full estimation sample that appear in Panel 
B of Table 1.2. Eliminating patients that have PRA values that “straddle” the cutoff does not 
have any significant impact on the point estimates of the discontinuity in the probability of 
receiving a kidney from a living donor. Interestingly, though, the point estimates increase in  
magnitude when the analysis is conducted on the sub-sample of patients with “stable” PRA 
values. While it is not immediately clear why there would be heterogeneous treatment effects for 
patients with relatively stable PRA values and those that do not, one possible explanation is that 
 
 
Table 1.5: Analysis on Sub-samples 
Probability of Receiving Kidney from Living Donor
Discontinuity Estimate -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.043***
Sample: Full estimation sample (n = 39,111) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Discontinuity Estimate -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.052***
Sample: Eliminate observations that "straddle"  cutoff (n = 34,693) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Discontinuity Estimate -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.071***
Sample: Patients with "stable"  PRA (n = 13,885) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Polynomial Order 2nd 2nd 2nd
Individual Characteristics Included? N Y Y
Year Dummies Included? N N Y
Transplant Center Dummies Included? N N Y
Notes:
1. Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses (clustered at PRA level)
2. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1  
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patients with stable PRA values know with more certainty their position on the PRA scale, and in 
particular, on which side of the cutoff they lie. A patient who has experienced variation in her 
PRA value will know with relatively less certainty, at any given point in time, where their PRA 
value lies on the PRA distribution. Therefore, it could be that patients who have PRA values near 
the cutoff, but who have also exhibited variation in their PRA values in the past, may hold off on 
opting for living donor transplantation with the expectation (or hope) that they will end up with a 
high enough PRA value to place them above the cutoff (and thus qualify for improved access to 
the pool of publicly available kidneys).12 
 Another concern is that the point estimates reflect a spurious change in the conditional 
expectation of  at the PRA cutoff, rather than any kind of meaningful economic behavior. 
In order to test for this, I re-estimate equation (1.2) using a range of placebo cutoffs. In 
particular, I estimate the “discontinuities” at each PRA value between 10 and 75, and between 85 
and 95. This yields 77 additional discontinuity estimates, in addition to the discontinuity 
calculated at the PRA cutoff of 80. Figure 1.4 plots the histogram of these 78 point estimates. As 
expected, the mean and median point estimate estimated at the placebo cutoffs is close to zero. 
More importantly, the discontinuity estimated at the PRA cutoff of 80 is in the tail of the 
distribution of these estimates. This implies that the discontinuity estimates reported in Table 2 
are not a “fluke” of the data. 
iLDKT
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This paper examines whether patients with improved access to the pool of publicly 
available kidneys are less likely to receive a privately supplied kidney from a living donor. Using 
                                                 
12 If this hypothesis is true, then the presence of the PRA “notch” at 80 is still distorting private behavior.  
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Figure 1.4 
 
data on the universe of kidney waitlist and transplant activity from 1997 through 2006, I confirm 
this hypothesis empirically. Identification comes from a discontinuity in the probability that the 
patient can receive a publicly available kidney that is generated by the kidney allocation policy. 
The estimates imply that a 10 percentage point increase in the probability that a patient will 
receive a publicly provided kidney from the waitlist decreases the probability that a patient will 
receive a kidney privately from a living donor by 2.6 to 3.4 percentage points. These estimates 
appear to be internally valid, and are robust to a variety of specification checks.  
 The results imply that the public provision of kidneys may not fully crowd-out the private 
supply of kidneys from living donors. In particular, the crowd-out effect estimated here is 
smaller than the crowd-out implied by public programs like public health insurance (Cutler and 
Gruber 1996 ; Gruber and Simon 2008) and unemployment insurance (Cullen and Gruber 2000). 
Given the potential costs and disutility that can be imposed on the patient and her social network 
33 
 
by opting for living kidney donation, a natural question is why the effect estimated here is not 
larger. There are a few factors to consider. First, patients and members of their social network 
may be exhibiting some level of risk aversion. Even though the allocation policy increases the 
probability of receiving a publicly available kidney for patients just above the PRA cutoff, it 
does not ensure with 100 percent certainty that the patient will receive a kidney from the waitlist. 
In the face of this uncertainty, some patients and members of their social network may always 
opt for living donation since that option yields a kidney (and improved health) for the patient 
with certainty.   
 Another possibility is that there are quality differences between kidneys from living 
donors and kidneys procured from deceased donors. Indeed, it is a well-established fact in the 
transplant literature that kidneys from living donors survive longer than kidneys from deceased 
donors. If some patients and their families demand higher quality kidneys, then they may always 
opt for living donation, regardless of the patient’s ability to access the pool of publicly available 
kidneys. Put differently, as long as the quality level of publicly available kidneys remains 
sufficiently low, then there may exist some portion of patients that will always opt for living 
kidney donation. This behavior would be consistent with the predictions of the theoretical work 
on the public provision of private goods, as in Besley and Coate (1991). 
 Finally, the results of this paper support the findings of Howard (forthcoming), and have 
salient policy implications. As the transplant community considers policies that are aimed at 
increasing the number of deceased donors, such as presumed consent for organ donation, it is 
important that it understands the potential for crowd-out of living kidney donation. The results of 
this analysis imply that the crowd-out would be less than full, which suggests that the effect of 
expanding the pool of publicly available kidneys would be a net increase in the total number of 
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kidney transplants performed. In addition, while “crowd-out” is often considered in pejorative 
terms, in this case it may not represent a social inefficiency, from an economic point of view. In 
particular, given the potential disutility and anxiety associated with having a loved one go 
through the donation process, the ability to substitute away from living donation toward utilizing 
publicly provided kidneys for transplantation may be welfare enhancing for patients and their 
families. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Exploring the Volume-Outcome Effect: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The association between provider volume and patient outcomes is well documented in the 
medical literature. In comprehensive literature reviews, both Halm, Lee, and Chassin (2002) and 
Choudhury, Dagash, and Pierro (2007) conclude that over 70 percent of articles on the topic find 
that patients that are treated by higher volume providers experience relatively good outcomes. 
Recently, economists and health services researchers have questioned whether this association 
represents a causal relationship, and if so, which direction the causation runs. There are three 
scenarios to consider. First, by performing a procedure more often, a provider (either an 
individual physician, or the entire hospital) becomes more skilled at the procedure, which 
reduces the probability of complications for the patient. This “practice makes perfect” hypothesis 
implies that there exist some kind of economies of scale with respect to patient outcomes 
(Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt 2005). An alternate explanation is that the causal relationship runs 
from outcomes to volume. In this “selective referral” hypothesis (Luft, Hunt, and Maerki 1987), 
providers vary in unobserved (to the researcher) quality, and physicians refer their patients to the 
higher quality providers. Finally, patients may self-select to higher or lower volume providers 
based on unobserved dimensions of health. For example, the observed pattern in the medical 
literature could be explained by “sicker” patients sorting themselves to low volume providers. 
On the other hand, sicker patients could differentially sort themselves to higher volume 
providers, in which case the magnitude of the volume-outcome relationship may be understated 
if patient selection is not accounted for.  
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In this paper, I examine the volume-outcome relationship in the context of kidney 
transplantation. In 2010, 13,472 adults received a kidney transplant; 63 percent of transplanted 
kidneys were from deceased donors, and the remaining 37 percent from living donors.13 While 
kidney transplantation remains the best treatment option for patients with kidney failure, the 
success of the procedure is not always certain. Based on national statistics, approximately 8 
percent of recipients will experience failure of the transplanted kidney within one year of their 
transplant (OPTN/SRTR 2009). Many factors contribute to graft survival – the quality of the 
transplanted organ, the immunological match between the donor and the recipient, and even the 
amount of time between when the organ is recovered and when it is transplanted.14 The question 
I address in this paper is whether there exists a causal effect of performing more transplants on 
outcomes for transplant recipients. Axelrod et al. (2004) document that higher volume kidney 
transplant centers have lower rates of one-year graft failure rates than lower volume transplant 
centers. However, the authors do not address the likelihood that there are other differences 
between transplant centers other than volume that are correlated with patient outcomes. 
Identifying the true causal effect of transplant center volume on recipient outcomes is 
important because Medicare is the primary payer for kidney transplants in the United States; in 
2008, the program spent $23 billion on the care of patients with end stage renal disease, $242 
million of which was spent on kidney transplants (USRDS 2010). When a recipient experiences 
graft failure, she will return to dialysis, which is the least cost-effective treatment option for 
patients with kidney failure (Mullins et al 2003). Medicare pays approximately $91,000 per year 
for a patient that has experienced graft failure (USRDS 2010). If there does exist a causal 
                                                 
13 Data taken from Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) data website, available here: 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ 
14 The “graft” is the transplanted kidney.  
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volume-outcome relationship, then Medicare (and other insurers) may realize cost savings if 
transplants were concentrated at a fewer number of transplant centers.  
A unique feature of addressing the volume-outcome relationship in kidney transplantation 
is that the number of transplants that a transplant center performs is limited by the available 
supply of transplantable kidneys. This fact allows me to employ several strategies that plausibly 
identify the causal effect of volume on patient outcomes. The first is to estimate transplant 
center-by-year fixed effects models which would eliminate any biases generated by differences 
in unobserved center quality that is likely correlated with volume. In this framework, within-
transplant center variation in volume, driven by plausibly exogenous shocks in the supply of 
kidneys, is used to explain within-center variation in outcomes for otherwise identical patients. 
As discussed later, the use of transplant center fixed effects may not fully address systematic 
unobserved differences in patients that are correlated with volume. Thus, I also use an 
instrumental variables approach to exploit plausibly exogenous shifts in transplant center 
volume. Usually, kidneys are allocated regionally, with recovered organs being offered first to 
patients registered at local transplant centers. One exception to this rule is that if a patient on the 
waitlist is a perfect immunological match to a recovered kidney, that patient is offered the kidney 
regardless of her geographical distance from the kidney. That is, when a kidney is a “perfect 
match” to someone on the national waitlist, the usual regional allocation policy is superseded and 
the kidney is offered nationally. From the perspective of the recipient’s transplant center, the 
offer of a “perfect match” kidney represents one additional transplant that it would not have 
otherwise performed. Therefore, in this second estimation approach, within-transplant center 
variation in the number of “perfect matches” will be used in the first stage to predict within-
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center variation in volume. Because these “perfect matches” occur in a random fashion, I argue 
that they meet the usual requirements for instrument validity.    
The results suggest that “naïve” models that do not account for between hospital 
differences in underlying quality overstate the volume-outcome relationship. For example, 
results from pooled OLS models suggest that transplant volume significantly reduces the 
probability of adverse patient outcomes, both in the short term (i.e. one week post-transplant) 
and longer term (one year post-transplant). Estimates from fixed-effects and instrumental 
variables models, however, suggest a smaller and often statistically insignificant relationship 
between transplant center volume and patient outcomes. Taken together, the results imply that 
much, if not all, of the observed volume-outcome relationship observed in kidney transplantation 
is due to underlying differences across transplant centers. From a policy perspective, these 
results require careful consideration. On one hand, transplant candidates should consider 
registering at higher volume transplant centers because those centers have, on average, better 
patient outcomes than lower volume transplant centers. On the other hand, it is unknown if there 
might exist diseconomies of scale if transplants became more concentrated at relatively few 
transplant centers.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background on 
the volume-outcome literature in general, and specifically in the case of kidney transplantation. 
The third section describes the institutional setting. The fourth section provides a discussion of 
which measures of provider volume are typically used in the literature, and which one I use in 
this analysis. The fifth section discusses the identification strategy and estimation, which is 
followed by a description of the dataset and construction of the estimation sample. The seventh 
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section presents the empirical results, which is followed by a discussion of the policy 
implications of these empirical findings. The last section concludes the paper.  
 
2.2 The Volume-Outcome Effect 
 There exists a large number of studies on the volume-outcome relationship in medical 
care. The consensus of these studies is that patients who receive their care at providers that 
perform a relatively large number of a procedure experience better outcomes than patients who 
have their procedure performed at lower volume providers. This relationship is usually attributed 
to “learning-by-doing” or “practice makes perfect:” higher volume providers have a greater stock 
of experience that they can draw upon, thus yielding improved patient outcomes. If “practice 
makes perfect” explains the observed volume-outcome relationship, then the direction of 
causality runs from volume to outcomes. While this explanation has intuitive appeal, the 
empirical challenge lies in disentangling the volume effect from other mechanisms that also 
explain the observed pattern in the data. For example, provider volume may simply be a proxy 
for underlying quality of providers. In other words, patients are attracted to, or are referred to, 
providers who have better patient outcomes (this is the “selective referral” hypothesis (Luft, 
Hunt, and Maerki 1987)). If this is true, the direction of causality is reversed: outcomes drive 
volume. In addition, patients may differentially sort themselves to high or low volume providers 
along unobserved (to the researcher) dimensions of underlying health. Therefore, a regression of 
patient outcomes on provider volume does not necessarily yield an unbiased estimate of the 
effect of performing an additional procedure on patient outcomes. 
 There are two main strategies used in the health economics and health services research 
that attempt to “control” for any kind of selective sorting by patients. The first is to include 
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provider fixed-effects in the estimations to control for time-invariant differences across providers 
that are correlated with both volume and outcomes. Therefore, the volume effect is identified 
from within-provider variation in the number of procedures performed over time. Hamilton and 
Hamilton (1997) show that differences in outcomes for hip surgery patients in Quebec are 
explained largely by between-hospital differences in unobserved determinants of outcomes; the 
fixed-effect estimate of the volume effect is statistically insignificant. Ho (2002) shows that 
within-hospital increases in PTCA volume are associated with relatively small, yet statistically 
significant, improvements in patient outcomes. In either case, the fixed effects specification 
assumes that within-provider variation in volume is uncorrelated with other determinants of 
outcomes that are unobserved to the researcher. This may be an innocuous assumption over 
shorter panels, but may be less tenable over longer time spans, because unobserved factors that 
affect outcomes may change within a provider over time. For example, a hospital may contract 
with higher quality surgeons or nurses over time. In this scenario, the hospital attracts more 
patients because of the improved quality of the surgical team, and thus within-hospital variation 
in volume is correlated with unobserved (to the researcher) changes in underlying quality at the 
hospital. 
 More recent studies have used an instrumental variables (IV) approach (Gaynor, Seider, 
and Vogt 2005; Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town 2006; Tsai et al 2006; Huesch 2009). In these 
studies, patient distance from a provider serves as a plausibly exogenous predictor of provider 
volume. In the first stage of the analysis, distance from the patient’s home to each provider in the 
patient’s choice set is assumed to be an exogenous predictor for where the patient receives her 
care. The identifying assumption is that patients do not choose their residence based on 
unobserved preferences for having (future) care performed at a particular provider. Likewise, it 
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is assumed that providers do not locate where they expect demand for their services to be the 
greatest. For each provider a measure of expected volume serves as an instrument for actual 
volume. Across all of these studies, the volume-outcome effect is much smaller in the IV 
specification than in the ordinary least squares (OLS) specification, and is usually statistically 
insignificant. However, Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt (2005) and Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town 
(2006) conclude that provider volume can be treated as exogenous.15 
 There is one paper in the medical literature that has examined the volume-outcome 
relationship in the context of adult kidney transplantation. Axelrod et al (2004) compare the 
outcomes of transplant recipients, defined as graft failure at one year post-transplant, across 
hospitals that lie in different quartiles of average annual volume across the study period (1996 
through 2000). Their results suggest that transplant recipients who have their transplant 
performed at either “low” or “very low” volume transplant centers are more likely to experience 
graft failure within one year of their transplant. In addition, they find that most of this effect is 
driven by short-term graft failure (graft failure within one month of transplant). However, the 
analysis does not account for differences between transplant centers that may be correlated with 
both transplant volume and patient outcomes. One advantage of their study, however, is that they 
include clinical measures of patient illness, which is an improvement over studies that simply 
control for patient demographics (Tsai et al. 2006). 
 Should transplant center volume be treated as exogenous? The available evidence 
suggests not, and points to both selective referral and patient selection as plausible explanations 
for Axelrod et al’s (2004) findings. First, unlike other procedures studied in the volume-outcome 
                                                 
15 In both studies, the estimates from the IV specification are statistically insignificant. Gaynor et al (2005) reject the 
null that the IV estimate is statistically different from the estimate generated by the specification that treats volume 
as exogenous. However, the p-value of the test is .06, which is very close to the usual p-value of .05 that is used to 
reject the null hypothesis. Gowrisankaran et al (2006) state that “any evidence suggesting endogeneity was not 
overwhelming”, but do not provide any statistical evidence for their claim.  
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literature, transplants do not occur immediately after the patient chooses her provider. Kidney 
failure is a gradual disease that is most often caused by hypertension and diabetes. When patients 
learn that they need a kidney transplant, they choose the transplant center at which they will 
receive their transplant, as well as their pre- and post-surgical care. Because of excess demand 
for kidneys in the United States, the median waiting time for a transplant is over 3 years, 
although there is significant regional variation in waiting times (OPTN/SRTR 2009). In the 
meantime, patients with kidney failure can rely on dialysis as a maintenance treatment. 
Therefore, relative to other surgical procedures, potential transplant candidates have significant 
time to choose which transplant center at which they will receive their care. They may do this 
passively (i.e. they go with the recommendation of their nephrologists), or they may actively 
compare transplant centers using transplant center performance reports that are publicly available 
on the Internet. These reports are published twice a year by the Scientific Registry of Transplant 
Recipients (SRTR) and include information (at the center level) on the number of transplants 
performed, the median time to transplant for patients, and actual graft and patient survival rates. 
In addition, the reports include expected rates of graft and patient survival that are constructed 
for each transplant center using the characteristics of transplant recipients at that particular 
center. The reports also provide a test of whether the difference between the actual and expected 
graft and patient survival rates are statistically significant. The difference between actual and 
expected performance can be considered a proxy for the quality of care provided at a particular 
center.  
Howard (2008) tests whether transplant candidates sort themselves based on this measure 
of quality across transplant centers within their choice set. In particular, he shows that private 
insurers contract with the transplant centers that perform better (in regards to recipient 
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outcomes), and therefore privately insured individuals are directed to better performing centers, 
which is consistent with the selective-referral hypothesis. A surprising result is that more 
educated patients are differentially likely to choose a better performing transplant center than 
less educated patients, as would be expected. One caveat is that the data span registrations from 
2000 to 2002, when Internet use was less widespread than it is currently. Therefore, the SRTR 
reports may not have been as visible to transplant candidates as they are today. 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics provided in Axelrod et al (2004) show that there 
are significant differences in the observable characteristics of both transplant recipients and the 
donors across the volume quartiles. In particular, when comparing “very low” to “high” volume 
transplant centers, the authors show statistically significant differences in transplant recipient 
age, race, primary diagnosis, time on dialysis, as well as significant differences in donor age, 
status (living versus deceased), ischemic time, and expanded criteria designation.16 Because 
these characteristics are also independent predictors of outcomes, simply controlling for these 
factors may not account for unobserved heterogeneity in patient characteristics that varies 
systematically by transplant center volume that also affects patient outcomes.  
A natural question is why one should expect patient outcomes to be related to transplant 
volume, especially since the surgical procedure itself has changed very little since 1951 and rates 
of surgical complications are low (Humar and Matas 2005). Some of the causes of graft failure 
are directly related to surgical technique: renal artery thrombosis can be caused by the kinking of 
blood vessels and renal artery stenosis can be caused by improper suturing technique (Humar and 
Matas 2005). Apart from more practice at the surgical technique, increased volume and 
                                                 
16 Expanded criteria donors (ECDs) are donors that meet the following criteria: a donor age 60 or older, or a donor 
age 50 or older with two of the following three conditions: history of high blood pressure, high serum creatinine (an 
indication of impaired kidney function), or death resulting from stroke. Kidneys from ECDs are considered to be of 
marginal quality.   
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experience dealing with recipients may improve the ability of transplant centers to recognize, and 
treat, the early signs of complications. Larger volume transplant centers will have more 
experience evaluating the quality of donor kidneys, a key determinant of patient outcomes, and 
whether a kidney from donor X would be an appropriate match for patient Y. Post-transplant, the 
probability of graft failure or patient mortality will depend in part on the patient’s adherence to 
immunosuppressive medications. Larger volume transplant centers may be better able to monitor 
their recipients’ post-transplant medication regimen than lower volume centers. On a similar 
note, the availability of new immunosuppressive medications have increased over time, which 
has provided transplant centers more flexibility in tailoring patient-specific post-transplant drug 
regimens. Danovitch (2001) points out that “transplant centers tend to be loyal to their own 
[immunosuppressive] protocols, which often have been developed in response to local 
experience.” Therefore, larger transplant programs have more experience to draw upon when it 
comes to designing effective immunosuppressive drug regimens for their patients. This 
experience can translate to lower rates of graft failure or patient mortality.  
 
2.3 Institutional Setting  
The goal of this paper is to identify the volume effect in kidney transplantation, if one 
exists. A description of the institutional setting is required to motivate the empirical strategy. As 
noted earlier, one unique aspect of examining the volume-outcome relationship in kidney 
transplantation is the fact that the number of transplants that a center performs is limited by the 
number of available transplantable kidneys. The supply of transplantable kidneys comes from 
two sources: deceased donors and living donors. Kidneys from deceased donors are allocated 
according to strict allocation rules developed and maintained by the United Network of Organ 
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Sharing (UNOS). These kidneys are allocated regionally, with kidneys first offered to patients 
registered to transplant centers within the same local area of the donor (i.e. within the same organ 
procurement organization (OPO) service area). Among blood-compatible patients within the 
OPO, patients with the longest waiting time are typically offered the kidney first, although there 
are some exceptions to that rule. Therefore, transplant center volume is a function of the local 
supply of kidneys, as well as the number of candidates waitlisted at a transplant center. Within a 
particular OPO, the transplant center with more candidates will, on average, perform more 
transplants than centers with fewer candidates on the waitlist. 
Therefore, the key question is what drives variation in the size of waitlists across 
transplant centers, even within a local area. That is, why are transplant candidates more likely to 
register at some transplant centers rather than others? There are three factors to consider. The 
first is distance from the patient’s home to the transplant center. Once a kidney becomes 
available for a patient, the patient has a window of time to get to her transplant center. If the 
patient cannot get to the transplant hospital in sufficient time, then she will be passed over and 
the kidney will be offered to another candidate on the waitlist.17 In addition, while the candidate 
waits for her transplant, she must go to her transplant center for periodic examinations to identify 
changes in the patient’s condition, or her suitability as a transplant candidate. Therefore, the 
number of transplant centers within a patient’s choice set will depend on her proximity to those 
transplant centers. Second, the patient’s insurer will play a large role in a patient’s choice of 
transplant center. Patients covered by Medicare can register at any of the certified transplant 
centers in the country. Privately insured patients will be limited to the transplant centers with 
                                                 
17There is no published rule that strictly defines the window of time that a patient has to get to her transplant center. 
The decision of whether the patient can get to her transplant center in sufficient time is likely made on a case by case 
basis.    
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whom their insurer has contracted. Medicaid patients will be limited to transplant centers within 
their state of residence.  
Finally, as discussed earlier, patients may be sort themselves to better performing 
transplant centers within their choice set. They may do this actively by using the biannual center-
specific performance reports published by SRTR. Or they may be directed to better performing 
centers by their physicians or their insurer (Howard 2008). This is consistent with the selective 
referral hypothesis whereby volume is caused by unobserved (to the researcher) underlying 
differences in the quality of care provided by transplant centers. The challenge then is to 
disentangle any kind of selective sorting from the true volume effect. 
 
2.4 Which Volume Measure to Use? 
Before discussing the estimation strategy, I turn to the issue of which volume measure to 
use in the analysis. In the literature, the usual measures of volume are either the number of 
procedures performed at a hospital in the year of a patient’s procedure (as in Gaynor, Seider, and 
Vogt (2005)) or the number of procedures performed in the quarter of a patient’s procedure (as in 
Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town (2006) and Huesch (2009)). These measures of volume are likely 
an artifact of the datasets that are used for analysis.18 In addition, because these are 
contemporaneous measures, they implicitly include procedures that are performed by a provider 
after a given patient’s procedure.19 Apart from these issues, the literature does not provide a 
discussion of which volume measure is the optimal measure of recent provider experience. That 
is, what is the appropriate “lookback” window to use when calculating a provider’s volume? In 
                                                 
18 These studies use state-level hospital discharge datasets that mask the exact date of a procedure, and instead 
include only the quarter or the year in which a procedure was performed.  
19 For example, in these studies, a patient who is treated in January 2006 would be assigned that hospital’s 2006 
level of volume.  
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the current context, I assert that 30 day volume is the best available measure to use to capture the 
effect of volume changes on transplant center performance. As I empirically show later, I find 
strong evidence of depreciation of experience from one 30 day “block” to another. In particular, 
holding constant 30 day volume, volume in the 31 to 60 days or the 61 to 90 days prior to a 
patient’s transplant has no economically or statistically significant effect on transplant center 
performance, which implies that any benefit of transplant center experience in the 31 to 90 days 
prior to a patient’s transplant depreciates rather quickly. This finding is consistent with 
Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town (2006) and Huesch (2009) which both estimate large rates of 
depreciation of hospital and surgeon experience.  Therefore, if experience depreciates rapidly 
from one 30 day “block” to another, then it stands to reason that the human capital of the 
transplant team may appreciate during above-average periods of transplant volume.  
As discussed earlier, the surgical procedure to transplant a kidney has changed very little 
since 1951. Therefore, one might not expect changes in recent volume to affect the productivity 
of transplant surgeons since the procedure is well-established. However, kidney transplantation 
is a team-oriented process, which involves surgeons, transplant coordinators, nurses, etc. While 
an increase in volume may not affect surgeon performance, it may affect the performance of 
other team members, which is reflected in patient outcomes. 
 
2.5 Empirical Strategy  
As a first step in thinking about how volume affects the outcomes of kidney transplant 
recipients, I start with a baseline pooled OLS model of transplant recipient outcomes: 
 
(2.1) 0 1 , 30 2 3 4
Dem Clin Don
iht iht iht iht iht ihty Vol X X Xβ β β β β ε−= + + + + +  
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 where ihty  represents the outcome of transplant recipient i who received her transplant in year t at 
transplant center h.20 DemihtX , , and 
Clin
ihtX
Don
ihtX  are vectors of patient demographic characteristics, 
patient clinical information, and donor characteristics, respectively. I include these covariates to 
adjust for differences in patient characteristics and quality of donor organs, which may be 
correlated with transplant center volume. Of interest is the parameter 1β , which captures the 
conditional correlation of the level of transplant volume at transplant center h in the 30 days 
preceding recipient i’s transplant with the recipient’s post-transplant outcomes. Equation (2.1) 
uses both between and within transplant center variation in 30 day volume to estimate the effect 
of 30 day volume on patient outcomes. Given the discussion above, it is likely that the estimated 
effect will be biased, either due to patient selection along unobserved dimensions of health, or 
due to selective referral. Nonetheless, estimation of (2.1) provides a baseline set of results which 
serve as a starting point for the remaining analyses.  
 Decomposing the error term in (2.1) illustrates why using pooled OLS to estimate (2.1) 
will likely lead to a biased estimate of the volume effect: 
 
(2.2) iht ht i ihtε α λ ω= + +  
 
In (2.2), htα  is an unobserved attribute (or a set of attributes) of transplant center h in year t, 
iλ represents unobserved characteristics of transplant recipient i, and ihtω  is an idiosyncratic error 
                                                 
20 It is important to note that the data do not include surgeon identifiers, so this analysis is done at the transplant 
center level. Since transplantation - from pre-transplant coordination, to donor evaluation, to the surgical process 
itself, and to post-transplant care - is a team-orientated process, identifying the volume effect at the organizational 
level is arguably more intuitive than focusing narrowly on the volume effect at the surgeon level.  
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term that is mean zero and assumed to be uncorrelated with any of the regressors in (2.1). Under 
the selective referral hypothesis, htα represents unobserved transplant center quality that varies 
over time, with the assumption that , 30v( , ) 0ht htVolco α − > . Under this scenario, estimating (2.1) 
using OLS will generate a biased estimate of the volume effect. For example, if the outcome of 
interest is patient mortality (i.e. ihty = 1 if the recipient dies, and 0 otherwise), the fact 
that , 30cov( , ) 0ht htVolα − >  and cov( ht , ) 0ihtyα < indicates that the OLS estimate of the volume 
effect will be negatively biased. That is, failing to account for unobserved differences in 
underlying quality that are also correlated with volume will overstate (in magnitude) the size of 
the volume effect.  
 To address these sources of bias, I add transplant center-by-year fixed effects to the 
specification outlined in (2.1): 
 
0 1ihty V ,o 3l 0 2 3
Dem Clin
iht ihtX X 4
Don
iht iht ht ihtX Dβ β β+ β+= + β− + + +ξ(2.3)  
 
The volume effect estimated by (2.3) is identified from variation in 30 day volume within a 
given year at a given transplant center. The identifying assumption is that conditional on the 
fixed effects, the residual variation in volume is uncorrelated with ihtξ , where iht i ihtξ λ ω= + . In 
the current setting, this may be a plausible assumption: changes in transplant center volume will 
be driven by exogenous supply shocks in the number of available transplantable kidneys. That is, 
the volume effect is identified by comparing otherwise observably identical recipients that go to 
the same transplant center in the same year, but that receive their transplants at times when the 
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transplant center has experienced changes in its 30 day volume, generated by the randomness of 
offers from the supply of transplantable kidneys. 
 A natural question is whether there is sufficient variation in 30 day volume within a 
transplant center in a given year to identify any effects on transplant center performance. Clearly, 
longer “lookback” windows (e.g. 60 or 90 day volume) will have less variation within a 
transplant center within a year. However, in the empirical evidence I present later, it is clear that 
there is enough variation in 30 day volume among transplant recipients within a transplant center 
in a year to identify the effects of changes in transplant center volume on performance, as 
measured by patient outcomes.  
 The motivation for using the fixed-effects specification to estimate the volume effect is 
that the volume and timing of transplants are determined exogenously by supply shocks in the 
number of kidneys that are made available to particular transplant centers. These shocks would 
apply to the supply of deceased donor kidneys, which are subject to the strict allocation rules 
described earlier. But approximately one-third of kidneys come from living donors, which are 
not subject to the same kinds of rules that govern the allocation of deceased donor kidneys. One 
concern is that the timing and number of living donor transplants may be correlated with the 
volume of deceased donor transplants performed. Because transplant recipients that opt for living 
donation may be different, on average, than those that opt to wait for a deceased donor along 
unobserved dimensions, this kind of correlation would lead to biased fixed-effects estimates.21 
Consider the following example. A transplant center schedules its living donor transplants such 
                                                 
21 The donors are likely to be systemically different as well. Living donors go through intensive medical screening to 
ensure that they are healthy enough for the surgery. Part of the rationale for the intensive screening is that organ 
donation is a surgical procedure from which the living donor derives no direct medical benefit, but that does 
introduce the possibility of complication or death. This is an apparent deviation from the “first, do no harm” ethos in 
medicine. Thus, transplant programs aim to only accept the healthiest living donors. Therefore, kidneys from living 
donors are likely to be healthier, on average, than kidneys from deceased donors, which would be correlated with 
improved recipient outcomes.  
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that the number of living donor transplants is uniformly distributed over time within a year.22 In 
periods with zero deceased donors, the total transplant volume of the center will simply equal the 
number of living donor transplants performed in that period. When the transplant center receives 
deceased donor kidneys from the local supply, then the total volume of transplants performed in 
a particular period is the sum of the living donor transplants and the deceased donor transplants 
performed in that period. In the fixed-effects framework, periods with few or no deceased donors 
(i.e. periods when just living donor transplants are performed) are more likely to be below the 
center’s average level of total volume. In other words, the probability that a patient receives a 
living donor transplant will be systematically correlated with the within-transplant center 
variation in total transplant volume (in particular, living donor recipients are more likely to 
receive their transplants during “below average” periods of total transplant volume). While donor 
status (living versus deceased) can be controlled for, there may be unobserved differences in 
patient and donor health that are also correlated with deviations from the transplant center-
specific average level of volume over time that are not adequately accounted for by the inclusion 
of donor status information. In the context of equation (2), the transplant center-by-year fixed 
effects, will not account for systematic differences in the patient specific component of the error 
term, iλ . 
 One strategy to circumvent this challenge would be to run the analysis only on the 
recipients of deceased donor transplants. However, this would eliminate roughly one third of all 
transplant recipients from the analysis, and there is no a priori reason to believe that surgical 
process (or post-surgical treatment) of transplanting a kidney from a living donor is any different 
                                                 
22 The idea that living donor transplants are scheduled bears out in the data. Less than one percent of all living donor 
transplants are performed on the weekend, and among weekdays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays appear to 
be more popular days than either Monday or Friday. Deceased donor transplants, on the other hand, are uniformly 
distributed across all seven days of the week. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion.  
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than transplanting a kidney from a deceased donor. Another strategy is to find an instrument that 
is uncorrelated with iλ , and is also predictive of transplant center volume. The rules of the kidney 
allocation policy offer a plausibly valid instrument: perfect match kidneys. As discussed earlier, 
kidneys from deceased donors are typically transplanted locally (within an OPO service area). 
One exception to this rule is when a patient on the national waitlist is a perfect immunological 
match to a deceased donor kidney. Each time a kidney is recovered, the antigen profile of the 
donor is compared to the entire national waitlist of transplant candidates.23 If a patient on the 
national waitlist is a perfect antigen match to the donor, then that patient is offered the kidney 
regardless of her geographical location.24 For example, a kidney recovered in Florida that would 
otherwise be transplanted in a patient in Florida will instead be offered to a patient elsewhere 
(e.g. in California), if that patient is a perfect antigen match to the kidney. From the viewpoint of 
the recipient’s transplant center, the offer of a perfect match kidney represents one additional 
transplant that it would not have otherwise performed in a given time period.  
This aspect of the allocation policy is not unlike a lottery for a kidney. Each time a 
kidney is recovered anywhere in the United States, any person on the national waitlist has a 
chance to receive that kidney. For the purposes of my identification strategy, it is important to 
note that the only factor that determines whether a patient is offered a perfect match kidney is the 
level of the antigen matching. Neither patient characteristics nor characteristics of the patient’s 
transplant center are taken into account when the offer is made. Given the data, I can empirically 
test the claim that the number of perfect match kidneys offered to a particular transplant center in 
                                                 
23 Antigens are proteins that can trigger a person’s immune system. Antibodies are “programmed” to attack antigens 
that are foreign to a person’s body. In the context of kidney transplantation, antigen matching is important because 
an increased number of antigen mismatches increases the likelihood that the recipient’s body will reject the 
transplanted kidney.  
24 There are six chances for an antigen mismatch. Therefore, a “perfect match” is one is which the donor and 
recipient express the same antigens, which greatly reduces the risk of organ rejection. This forms the rationale of 
perfect match/zero mismatch kidney sharing policy. 
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the last 30 days of recipient i’s transplant is uncorrelated with the recipient’s (and her donor’s) 
characteristics. As stated above, a perfect match kidney represents one additional transplant that 
the recipient’s transplant center would not have otherwise performed in a given period of time. 
Therefore, I also expect that the instrument will be strongly correlated with 30 day transplant 
volume.  
 To implement the instrumental variables approach, I estimate the first-stage equation: 
 
(2.4) , 30 0 1 , 30 2 3 4
Dem Clin Don
iht iht iht iht iht ht ihtVol PM X X X Dπ π π π π− −= + + + + + +ψ  
 
where  is the number of perfect match kidney transplants performed at the recipient i’s 
transplant center in the previous 30 days. The assumptions are 1) 
, 30ihtPM −
1 0π >  and 2) 
cov( , ) 0iht ihtξ ψ = . The first assumption is empirically testable. The second assumption cannot be 
directly tested, but evidence that the instrument is uncorrelated with observable characteristics 
will provide support to the claim. Note that in equation (2.4), I exploit within-transplant center-
year variation in the number of perfect match kidneys to predict within-transplant center-year 
variation in total transplant volume. The transplant center specific year fixed effects are required 
for the instrument to be valid. The number of perfect match kidneys offered to a particular 
transplant center will be a function of the number of transplant candidates registered at that 
transplant center. If variation in the number of registrations is driven by the selective referral 
hypothesis, then the instrument (in the cross-section) would be correlated with unobserved levels 
of quality that vary systematically between transplant centers. Therefore, the fixed effects 
removes bias associated with selective referral, and the instrumental variables approach should 
eliminate any remaining bias generated by within-transplant center variation in unobservable 
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patient characteristics that are correlated with both total transplant volume and patient outcomes. 
As usual, the fitted values of 30 day volume will replace the actual values of 30 day volume in 
the second stage equation.  
 To recap, the empirical strategy is three-pronged. First, I estimate pooled OLS equations 
to estimate the conditional correlation between 30 day volume and patient outcomes. Second, I 
add in transplant center specific year fixed effects, thereby addressing biases created by selective 
referral. As discussed above, the patient-specific component of the error term in the fixed effects 
equation may be correlated with within-transplant center volume. To address this, I use an 
instrumental variables approach as the last estimation strategy. For specifications where the 
dependent variable is binary, I estimate a linear probability model, which yields similar estimates 
to a probit specification, but allows for more intuitive interpretation of the estimated coefficients, 
as well as implementation of the IV estimator via two stage least squares. Standard errors are 
clustered at the transplant center-year level.  
 
2.6 Data and Sample Construction 
The data used in the analysis come from the United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) 
Standard Transplant Analysis and Research Files (STAR) on all kidney waitlist, transplant, and 
follow-up activity as of August 2008. These data include additions to the waitlist (new waitlist 
registrations) or removals from the waitlist, which can result from transplant, patient death, or if 
the patient is too ill to be considered a viable transplant recipient. The dataset includes detailed 
information on transplant candidates collected at the time of registration on the kidney waitlist, 
information about the transplant procedure (if a transplant is performed), and follow up 
information on the patient’s outcomes after the transplant (again, if a transplant is performed).  
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The advantage of using this dataset is that it covers the universe of kidney transplants in 
the United States, and each transplant recipient is followed after the transplant is performed. 
Therefore, by using this dataset, I am able to overcome any shortcomings of using state hospital 
discharge records, which is common in the volume-outcome literature. For example, rather than 
observing just inpatient mortality, I observe outcomes in the longer run. In addition, the data 
include a number of clinical measures that allows me to more precisely adjust for patient risk, as 
compared to relying on the assumption that patient demographics adequately capture 
heterogeneity in underlying illness at the time of surgery.   
I exclude pediatric transplant recipients from the analysis because they make up a small 
percentage of all transplants (4.4 percent in 2010), and they are a subsample that is quite 
different than the sample of adult transplant recipients.25 This exclusion also removes all of the 
pediatric hospitals from the sample, where the vast majority of pediatric transplants are 
performed. Visual inspection of the names of the excluded transplant centers shows that all have 
the word “Children’s” in their name, and that the names of the included hospitals do not have 
any indication in their title that they are a children’s hospital.   
The main volume measure is the number of transplants performed at a patient’s transplant 
center in the 30 days preceding the recipient’s transplant. This is a “finer” measure of recent 
volume than is typically used in the literature.26In addition, it avoids the issue of assigning 
contemporaneous volume, which would implicitly assume that future volume affects a patient’s 
outcome. The rationale for using 30 day volume versus a broader look-back window was 
discussed earlier. Because the marginal benefit of performing one additional transplant is likely 
                                                 
25 Data taken from Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) data website, available here: 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ 
26 For example, Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt (2005) use annual volume and Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town (2006) and 
Huesch (2009) use quarterly volume.  
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decreasing in transplant center volume, I take the log transformation of 30 day volume to capture 
the non-linear effects.27 
Apart from the 30 day volume measure, there are five additional groups of variables that 
require definition: patient outcome measures, patient demographic characteristics, patient clinical 
measures, characteristics of the kidney donor, and the instrument. The main outcomes of interest 
are graft failure and patient mortality at one week, one month, and one year post-transplant. 
Axelrod et al (2004) focus on one year graft failure rates, but show that much of the association 
that they find is manifested in the first month post-transplant. To build upon Axelrod et al 
(2004), I also include patient mortality as an outcome, which is the usual outcome measure used 
in the literature. In addition to these six measures (three time periods each for graft failure and 
patient mortality), I also examine two additional outcomes. The first is the probability that the 
patient returns to dialysis within one week of the transplant. Return to dialysis does not 
necessarily indicate graft failure, but is an indication of delayed graft function, which can result 
if the transplanted kidney is from an older donor or from a donor with history of hypertension or 
diabetes (Perico et al 2004). The last outcome is the recipient’s glomerular filtration rate (GFR) 
at discharge. This is a measure of how well the patient’s renal system is filtering serum 
creatinine (a waste by-product of muscle activity) from the bloodstream. Therefore, higher GFR 
levels indicate better kidney function immediately after transplant. I use a slightly different 
specification when GFR is the outcome of interest. In particular, I include the recipient’s pre-
transplant GFR as an explanatory variable. Pre-transplant GFR is missing for a number of 
observations (discussed below), so the GFR regressions are estimated using the subsample of 
observations that have non-missing values of this regressor.  
                                                 
27 For observations where 30 day volume is equal to zero, I recode 30 day volume as .0001, and then take the log 
transformation. Results are robust to using other (small) values in place of zero.  
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Patient demographics include age at transplant, gender, race, education, and primary 
insurer. Because of the large number of observations with missing data on education status, I 
also include an indicator of whether education is missing or not. Patient clinical information 
includes indicators for the following: obesity, whether the patient was on dialysis at the time of 
transplant, whether the patient was hospitalized leading up to the transplant, poor functional 
status at time of transplant, patient primary diagnosis, previous kidney transplant recipient, 
patient “sensitization”, and the stage of the patient’s kidney disease. I calculated each recipient’s 
body mass index (BMI) using height and weight data, and then I coded a variable indicating 
obesity (BMI of 30 or higher). I coded a patient as being sensitized if her panel reactive antibody 
(PRA) value was 20 or higher.28 To develop the kidney disease stage variable, I converted each 
patient’s serum creatinine level to GFR using the method described in Levey et al (2006).29 
Then, I coded a patient as having stage 5 kidney disease if her GFR value was below 15 
mL/min/1.73m2.30 In addition to these indicator variables, I also control for the number of days 
that a patient waited for her transplant. As with educational status, I created indicator variables 
for missing BMI, PRA, GFR, and functional status information and included them in the 
analysis, rather than drop these observations.  
The demographic and clinical variables are meant to address patient selection and to 
adequately adjust for a recipient’s underlying health at the time of her transplant. In addition, 
information on the kidney donor is required to appropriately account for systematic differences 
                                                 
28 PRA is a measure of the percent of the population against whom the patient is “sensitized against.” Sensitized 
patients have immunological profiles that increase the odds of acute organ rejection. Most of the population has a 
PRA of zero (no level of sensitization), and the cutoff of 20 is used often in the transplant community to designate a 
patient as sensitized.  
29 Serum creatinine is a waste by-product of muscle activity that is typically filtered by the kidneys. Because muscle 
mass (and thus levels of serum creatinine) vary by age, race, and gender, the GFR calculation allows for a 
standardized measure of kidney function. Lower levels of GFR indicate impaired kidney function.  
30 Cutoff value taken from the guidelines provided by the National Kidney Foundation, accessed here on January 15, 
2011: http://www.kidney.org/kidneydisease/ckd/knowgfr.cfm 
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in the quality of organs used by transplant centers. This set of variables includes the age, race, 
and gender of the donor, the donor status (living versus deceased), the number of HLA 
mismatches between the donor and the recipient, and whether the donor is an “expanded criteria 
donor” (ECD). As described in an earlier note, ECDs are deceased donors that meet the 
following criteria: age 60 or older, or age 50 or older with two of the following three conditions: 
history of high blood pressure, high serum creatinine (an indication of impaired kidney function), 
or death resulting from stroke. As their name implies, these are donors that are of marginal 
quality. But given the persistent shortage of transplantable kidneys in the United States, 
utilization of these kidneys has increased, because a transplant with a lower-quality kidney may 
be a superior treatment option over maintenance dialysis for some patients. HLA mismatches 
refer to the degree of immunological mismatches between the donor and recipient; these can 
range from zero (perfect match) to six (total mismatch). Given the set of variables above, the 
following would indicate increased risk of graft failure: increased donor age, deceased status, 
increased number of HLA mismatches, and ECD status. Donor race and gender may not affect 
outcomes per se, but may proxy for additional underlying differences between donors that may 
affect outcomes (like risky behavior or history of disease).  
Finally, the instrument used in the estimation of equation (4) is the number of perfect 
match kidneys performed in the last 30 days at a recipient’s transplant center. These are defined 
as transplants from kidneys that are 1) either perfect matches or zero mismatches and 2) shared 
nationally. While the difference is subtle, a perfect match kidney is one that is a perfect six-out-
of-six antigen match to the recipient. A zero-mismatch kidney is one in which there is clinically 
no evidence of a mismatch between the recipient’s antigen profile, and that of the donor. 
Therefore, perfect match kidneys are a subset of all zero mismatch kidneys. For simplicity, I will 
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refer to all of these kidneys as “perfect matches.” There is no difference with respect to the 
allocation rules; all zero mismatch kidneys (of which perfect six-out-of-six matches are a subset) 
are subject to national sharing. The rationale for the second criteria (that they are shared 
nationally) is to reinforce the notion that the receipt of a perfect match kidney is an unforeseen 
and random event. In practice, this part of the definition of the instrument is not overly restrictive 
as most (approximately 85 percent) perfect match kidneys are shared nationally.  
The data set is restricted to adult kidney transplants performed in the United States 
between 1996 and 2005. These transplants were performed at 243 transplant centers over the ten 
year sample period. Some transplant centers opened and others closed during this time period, so 
the estimation sample is an unbalanced panel. In all analyses, I exclude the recipients of perfect 
match kidneys. These recipients receive kidneys that are of higher quality (they are perfect 
matches, by definition) and spend less time on the kidney waitlist than recipients of non-perfect 
match kidneys. Therefore, while recipients of perfect match kidneys may be similar to other 
recipients, the characteristics of their transplants are quite different. In other words, perfect 
match recipients are used for the purposes of constructing the instrument, but are themselves 
excluded from any outcomes regressions.31 The final estimation sample includes 117,137 adult 
transplants performed at all non-pediatric transplant centers in the United States (including 
Puerto Rico).    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 In reality, their inclusion in the estimation sample has no effect on the results. But since perfect match recipients 
are likely to have better outcomes due to the lack of antigen mismatches, and reduced waiting time, it seems natural 
to exclude them to ensure that their experience do not drive any of the results or conclusions.  
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2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 To motivate the idea that volume is related to transplant recipient outcomes, I first plot 
average patient outcomes against average 30 day volume. In Figures 2.1 – 2.8, each point in the 
graph represents a transplant center in the sample. The horizontal axis is the transplant center 
sample average of 30 day transplant volume. At first blush, it appears that there exists a clear 
negative relationship between volume and adverse patient outcomes in Figures 2.1 – 2.7; 
transplant centers that perform more transplants have, on average, better patient outcomes that 
those transplant centers that perform fewer transplants. However, it also appears that the 
association between average transplant volume and average patient outcomes is “flat” over a 
large range of average volume. In addition, while it appears that some lower volume transplant 
centers have worse patient outcomes, on average, there are a number of lower volume transplant 
centers that are clustered at zero (i.e. no adverse patient events). This may reflect the fact that the 
mean will be a noisier statistic at lower volume centers than at higher volume centers due to 
smaller sample sizes. Figure 2.8 plots average post-transplant glomerular filtration rate (GFR), a 
clinical measure of kidney function, against average 30 day volume. Higher values of GFR 
indicate better kidney function. However, there does not appear to be a clear positive relationship 
between post-transplant GFR and volume, as would be predicted by the volume-outcome 
relationship.  
 Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for selected variables, split by tercile of average 
transplant center 30 day volume. The last column provides a statistical test of the difference in 
average outcomes and characteristics between patients and donors at the transplant centers in the 
lowest and highest quartiles of average 30 day volume. There are clear differences in patient 
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demographics, patient clinical values, and donor characteristics between the lower and higher 
volume transplant centers, as well as distinct differences in patient outcomes. On average, 
outcomes are better at higher volume transplant centers, although the magnitude of the 
differences in outcomes (highest versus lowest tercile) varies depending on the outcome. Table 
2.1 also shows clear differences in the racial and ethnic makeup of transplant recipients across 
terciles of volume, as well as differences in their educational attainment and source of insurance. 
There is mixed evidence of positive selection of healthier patients (clinically) and donors at 
higher volume transplant centers. For example, transplant centers in the highest tercile of average 
30 day volume have fewer obese patients, fewer patients on dialysis or in the hospital at the time 
of transplant, and also are more likely to use kidneys from living donors than transplant centers 
in the lowest quartile. On the other hand, patients at higher volume transplant centers are more 
like to have poor functional status, to be immunologically sensitized, and to have had a previous 
transplant. In addition, the donors at higher volume centers are slightly older and are more like to 
be expanded criteria donors. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude from the evidence in Table 2.1 
what the net effect of patient or donor selection will have on the magnitude of the estimated 
volume effect.  
 
2.7.2 Pooled OLS Estimates 
 In order to test for systematic sorting of patients and donors to higher or lower volume 
transplant centers, I first estimate equation (2.1) without any patient or donor characteristics, and 
then  re-estimate (2.1) with patient and donor characteristics added as additional regressors. This 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics – Selected Variables 
Full Sample First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile p-value
Number of Observations 117,137 39,257 38,855 39,025
Number of Transplant Centers 243 161 56 26
Transplants in Last 30 Days 9.29 3.67 7.68 16.54 0.000
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Outcomes
Graft Failure: 1 Week 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Graft Failure: 1 Month 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.033 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Graft Failure: 1 Year 0.092 0.096 0.094 0.086 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Patient Died: 1 Week 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Patient Died: 1 Month 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.005
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Patient Died: 1 Year 0.044 0.048 0.042 0.043 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Patient Return to Dialysis: 1 Week 0.169 0.186 0.173 0.150 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Glomerular Filtration Rate at Discharge 41.23 41.70 39.74 42.24 0.016
(0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14)
Patient Demographics
Recipient Black 0.244 0.240 0.265 0.225 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Recipient White 0.575 0.595 0.544 0.587 0.036
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Recipient Hispanic 0.116 0.105 0.122 0.121 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Recipient Other Race 0.065 0.060 0.069 0.066 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary Insurer: Medicare 0.520 0.558 0.510 0.491 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Primary Insurer: Medicaid 0.046 0.045 0.054 0.039 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary Insurer: Private 0.414 0.367 0.420 0.454 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Primary Insurer: Other 0.020 0.029 0.015 0.016 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High School or Less 0.404 0.456 0.377 0.379 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education Status Missing 0.240 0.160 0.291 0.270 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
College or Higher 0.356 0.384 0.332 0.351 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics – Selected Variables (continued) 
Patient Clinical Information
Recipient Obese 0.219 0.232 0.213 0.213 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
On Dialysis 0.829 0.865 0.817 0.805 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
In Hospital 0.026 0.029 0.025 0.023 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Poor Functional Status 0.249 0.201 0.232 0.315 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Recipient Sensitized (PRA > 19%) 0.086 0.078 0.095 0.085 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Previous Kidney Transplant 0.083 0.077 0.086 0.086 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Donor / Transplant Characteritsics
Donor Age 38.42 37.78 38.56 38.94 0.000
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Donor: Living 0.419 0.393 0.432 0.432 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Donor: Expanded Criteria 0.098 0.092 0.104 0.100 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes
1. Table displays the descriptive statistics of the full sample (first column) and then by tercile of transplant center
average 30-day volume (columns 2, 3 and 4). The last column displays the p-value from a t-test of the difference
in means between the first and third tercile (column 2 versus column 4)
2. Terciles are calculated at transplant center level. For each transplant center in the estimation sample, I 
calculated average 30-day volume, and then took terciles based on that average. Therefore, each tercile has 
approximately the same number of transplants, but varying numbers of transplant centers. The transplant centers
in the first tercile are, on average, lower volume transplant centers, for example. 
3. The mean of each variable is displayed, and the standard error is reported in parentheses
 
 
provides an indirect test of systematic patient and donor selection, as well as a sense of how 
much of the volume-outcome association may be directly related to sorting, on net. Table 2.2 
presents the pooled OLS estimates of the volume effect for each of the eight outcomes. The 
specifications in the odd numbered columns include only the log of 30 day volume and year 
dummies as explanatory variables. The specifications in the even numbered columns include 
controls for patient demographics, patient clinical information, and donor characteristics. With 
the exception of GFR at discharge (panel D of Table 2.2), 30 day volume is strongly associated 
with patient outcomes. In addition, excluding controls for patient demographics, patient clinical 
information, and donor characteristics leads to an under-estimate of the volume-outcome 
relationship, which suggests that on net, patients, donors, or both are on average less healthy at 
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higher volume transplant centers. The estimates in panel A of Table 2.2 suggest that a 10 percent 
increase in 30 day volume is associated with a 1.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
graft failure one week post-transplant, a 2.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of graft 
failure one month post-transplant, and a 2.4 percentage point decrease in the probability of graft 
failure one year post-transplant. Based on the descriptive statistics, a ten percent increase in 30 
day volume is roughly equivalent to an increase of one transplant per 30 days.  
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that volume is negatively associated with the probability of 
patient mortality. For example, the estimates in panel B suggest that a 10 percent increase in 30 
day transplant volume is associated with a .4 percentage point decrease in the probability of  
patient mortality one week post-transplant. The association becomes stronger as the post-
transplant window is widened: the pooled OLS estimate of the association between volume and 
one-month mortality is approximately 75 percent larger in magnitude that the association 
measured at one week. Likewise, the volume-outcome association is over twice as large one year 
post-transplant as it is at one month post-transplant.  
 Panels C and D report the pooled OLS estimates for the remaining two outcomes. The 
results in panel C suggest that a 10 percent increase in 30 day volume is associated with a 5.6 
percentage point decrease in the probability that the recipient returns to dialysis within one week 
of her transplant. Unlike the results in panels A or B, though, the volume-outcome association 
becomes smaller in magnitude when the covariates are added into the specification. Finally, 
panel D suggests that there is no statistically signification association between 30 day volume, 
and the recipient’s glomerular filtration rate at discharge from the hospital.  
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Table 2.2: Pooled OLS Estimates 
A. Post-Transplant Graft 
Failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00140*** -0.00159*** -0.00182*** -0.00212*** -0.00212*** -0.00244***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.036
B. Post-Transplant Patient 
Mortality
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00033*** -0.00038*** -0.00054** -0.00068*** -0.00136*** -0.00152***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.032
C. Return to Dialysis Within 
One Week (13) (14)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00561*** -0.00427***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.002 0.116
D. GFR at Discharge (15) (16)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) 0.02562 -0.00453
(0.109) (0.090)
Observations 83,872 83,872
R-squared 0.003 0.197
Notes:
1. The table displays the pooled OLS estimates of the effect of a one percent increase in 30 day transplant volume 
one each of the eight outcome variables. The results in the odd numbered columns are from specifications where 
the regressors are log of 30 day volume and year dummy variables. The results in the even numbered columns are 
from the specification where patient demographics, patient clinical information, and donor/transplant characteristics 
are added as covariates. The transplant center fixed effects are omitted from all regressions.
2. The sample size in panel D is smaller because a number of observations have missing information on pre-
transplant GFR, which is included as a regressor in the specification where GFR at discharge is the outcome of 
interest.
3. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level)
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
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There is no a priori reason to expect that the pooled OLS estimates reported in Table 2.2 
reflect an unbiased estimate of the volume effect in kidney transplantation. However, the results 
do provide strong evidence that the observed volume-outcome association is not due to favorable 
selection to higher volume transplant centers. When patient clinical characteristics and donor 
characteristics are added to the specifications, the magnitude of the volume effect increases, 
which suggests, if anything, that net effect of patient and donor selection to higher volume 
centers biases the estimated volume association towards zero.  
 
2.7.3 Within Transplant Center-Year Variation in 30 Day Volume 
 Before turning to the fixed effects estimates, I present evidence that there is sufficient 
variation in 30 day volume within a transplant center within a particular year for the fixed effects 
estimation strategy to plausibly identify a volume-effect. First, I regressed the natural log of 30 
day volume on the set of transplant center-year fixed dummy variables. The R-squared from this 
regression is .482, which implies that the fixed effects account for 48 percent of the variation in 
the natural log of 30 day volume. The fixed effects estimates are identified from the remaining 
52 percent of 30 day volume variability.  
 Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 provide graphical evidence of the within transplant center-
year variation in 30 day volume. Figure 2.9 displays the distribution of 30 day volume within a 
high volume transplant center in a given year; figures 2.10 and 2.11 do the same, for medium and 
low volume centers, respectively.32The figures show that there exists significant variation in 30 
day volume within a transplant center in a given year. For example, 30 day volume ranges from 
                                                 
32 These are randomly selected transplant centers/years from the estimation sample. For brevity, I provide graphical 
evidence for three transplant centers only, but the graphical evidence across all transplant center/years support the 
notion that there is significant variation within a particular transplant center in a given year in 30 day transplant 
volume.  
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10 to 34 for the high volume transplant center displayed in figure 2.9. There is somewhat less 
variability in 30 day volume at the low volume transplant center presented in figure 3.11. These 
results suggest that the volume effect in kidney transplantation can be plausibly identified using 
the transplant center-year fixed effects.  
 
2.7.4 Fixed Effects Estimates 
 Table 2.3 reports the fixed effects estimates of the volume effect. For each of the eight 
outcomes, I estimated two fixed effects regressions. The first (in the odd numbered columns) 
exclude the covariates, and the second (in the even numbered columns) include the full set of 
covariates as regressors. With the exception of one week and one month graft failure, the 
volume-outcome association implied by the pooled OLS estimates largely goes away. The point  
 
Figure 2.9 
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 Figure 2.10 
 
 
Figure 2.11 
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estimates of the volume effect are smaller in magnitude and imprecisely estimated. However, a 
volume effect appears to persist for graft failure in the short run. The fixed effects estimates 
imply that a 10 percent increase in 30 day volume (approximately one additional transplant per 
30 days) is associated with a 1 percentage point decrease in the probability of one week graft 
failure, and a 1.4 percentage point decrease in one month graft failure. Based on the descriptive 
statistics, the estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in 30 day volume decreases the rate of 
one week graft failure by 45 percent (1 percentage point divided by sample mean of 2.2 percent) 
and the rate of one month graft failure by 38 percent (1.4 percentage points divided by sample 
mean of 3.7 percent). These represent large decreases in the probability of graft failure in the 
short run, but the effect does not appear to persist into the longer run (one year post transplant). 
The fixed effect estimates suggest that all of the relationship between patient mortality 
and volume is driven by between hospital differences in unobserved factors that are correlated 
with patient outcomes (panel B of Table 2.3). This finding is consistent with the conclusions of 
other fixed effects estimates of the volume effect, particularly Hamilton and Hamilton (1997). In 
addition, there is no evidence of a volume effect for return to dialysis and glomerular filtratation 
rate (panels C and D of Table 2.3). In fact, the sign of the volume effect for return to dialysis is 
positive, which suggests that an increase in 30 day volume increases the chances that a transplant 
recipient returns to dialysis within one week of her transplant, although the estimate is 
imprecisely estimated. 
 The results in Table 2.3 also provide indirect evidence of the internal validity of the fixed 
effects estimates. With the exception of panels C and D, the exclusion of the set of covariates 
from the specification leaves the estimated volume effect largely unchanged. This suggests that 
conditional on the transplant center-by-year fixed effects, 30 day volume is uncorrelated with the  
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Table 2.3: Fixed Effect Estimates 
A. Post-Transplant Graft 
Failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00102** -0.00103** -0.00136** -0.00137** -0.00119 -0.00120
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.027 0.034 0.026 0.038 0.030 0.062
B. Post-Transplant Patient 
Mortality
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.00044 -0.00042 -0.00077 -0.00072
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.021 0.026 0.022 0.032 0.025 0.056
C. Return to Dialysis Within 
One Week (13) (14)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) 0.00062 0.00032
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.077 0.177
D. GFR at Discharge (15) (16)
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.03159 -0.04068
(0.084) (0.074)
Observations 83,872 83,872
R-squared 0.110 0.276
Notes:
1. The table displays the fixed-effects estimates of the effect of a one percent increase in 30 day transplant volume 
on each of the eight outcome variables. The results in the odd numbered columns are from specifications where the 
regressors are log of 30 day volume and transplant center specific year dummy variables. The results in the even 
numbered columns are from the columns are from the specification where patient demographics, patient clinical 
information, and donor/transplant characteristics are added as covariates. 
2. The sample size in panel D is smaller because a number of observations have missing information on pre-
transplant GFR, which is included as a regressor in the specification where GFR at discharge is the outcome of 
interest.
3. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level)
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
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set of covariates, which confirms the claim that variation in 30 day volume is driven largely by 
exogenous supply shocks of transplantable kidneys. 
To fully address this claim, I first estimate an additional fixed effects regression in which 
30 day volume is regressed on the full set of covariates. The F-statistic from this regression is .83 
(p-value = .755), so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the set of covariates (jointly) is 
uncorrelated with 30 day volume. In addition, I also run 43 separate fixed effects regressions in 
which I regress each covariate on 30 day volume. The results of these regressions are reported in 
Table 2.4. Across almost all of the regressions, within-transplant center-by-year variation in 30 
day volume is uncorrelated with deviations from the transplant center-by-year mean of each of  
the covariates. These results provide additional direct evidence that the fixed effects estimates 
reported in Table 2.3 are unbiased. 
 Closer inspection of the results in Table 2.4 confirms one concern discussed earlier: 
conditional on the fixed effects, 30 day volume is negatively correlated with the probability that 
the recipient received her kidney from a living donor. Even though donor status (deceased versus 
living) can be directly controlled for, there may exist systematic differences in the quality of the 
kidneys from deceased donors versus those from living donors, as well as differences in the 
underlying health of the recipients of these kidneys. In particular, if kidneys from living donors 
are of higher quality than those from deceased donors (which would be correlated with improved 
patient outcomes), then the fixed effects estimate may be biased toward zero. 
 
 
2.7.5 Instrumental Variables Estimates 
 In order to address the concern that the fixed effects estimate may be biased, I also 
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Table 2.4: Correlation between 30 Day Volume and Covariates 
Recipient Age -0.04042 Recipient Obese 0.00085 Donor Age -0.07674*
(0.036) (0.001) (0.043)
Recipient Female -0.00136 BMI Missing 0.00000 Donor: Female 0.00005
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Recipient Black 0.00069 On Dialysis 0.00047 Donor: Black 0.00139*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Recipient White -0.00186 In Hospital -0.00027 Donor: White -0.00154
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Recipient Hispanic 0.00032 Poor Functional Status -0.00037 Donor: Hispanic 0.00019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Recipient Other Race 0.00085 Functional Status Missing -0.00026 Donor: Other Race -0.00004
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Primary Insurer: Medicare 0.00024
Glomerular Filtration Rate (GFR) at 
Transplant -0.01402 Donor: Living -0.00215*
(0.001) (0.034) (0.001)
Primary Insurer: Medicaid 0.00024 Stage 5 Kidney Disease 0.00058 Donor: Living, No Waitlist -0.00069
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary Insurer: Private -0.00031 GFR / Kidney Disease Stage Missing -0.00046 HLA Mismatches 0.00265
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Primary Insurer: Other -0.00017 Recipient Sensitized (PRA > 19%) -0.00012 Days Waiting 0.14143
(0.000) (0.001) (1.426)
High School or Less 0.00038 PRA Value Missing -0.00075 Donor: Expanded Criteria 0.00073
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Education Status Missing 0.00060 Primary Diagnosis: Diabetes 0.00042 Donor: Local to Recipient -0.00007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
College or Higher -0.00098
Primary Diagnosis: Hypertensive 
Nephroscelerosis -0.00064
(0.001) (0.001)
Primary Diagnosis: Glomerular Disease 0.00031
(0.001)
Primary Diagnosis: Polycystic Kidneys -0.00004
(0.001)
Primary Diagnosis: Other -0.00006
(0.001)
Primary Diagnosis: Missing 0.00044
(0.000)
Previous Kidney Transplant -0.00031
(0.001)
Notes:
1. Table displays the results from 43 separate regressions. Each covariate was regressed on (log) 30 day transplant volume, and the set of
transplant center-year dummies. The table displays the 43 estimates of the correlation between the covariates and 30 day transplant volume.
2. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level)
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Patient Demographics Patient Clinical Information Donor / Transplant Characteritsics
 
 
77 
 
implement an instrumental variables strategy. As discussed earlier, the IV is the number of 
perfectly matched kidneys that were transplanted a recipient’s transplant center in the 30 days 
prior to her transplant. The assumptions are that the number of perfectly matched kidneys will be 
a strong predictor of total 30 day volume, and only affects patient outcomes through its effect on 
30 day volume. As a partial check of the instrument’s validity, I regress the instrument on each 
of the covariates (separately) and the set of transplant center-by-year dummy variables. Showing 
that the instrument is uncorrelated with observable patient demographics, clinical information, 
and donor characteristics provides evidence that the instrument is also uncorrelated with 
unobserved factors that are correlated with patient outcomes, like underlying patient or donor 
health.  
 Table 2.5 displays the results of these regressions. Conditional on the fixed effects, the 
instrument is uncorrelated with 40 of the 43 covariates. The instrument is correlated with patient 
and donor gender, as well as the probability that the patient’s primary insurer is Medicaid, but 
these estimates are weakly statistically significant. More importantly, the instrument is 
uncorrelated with any of the measures of the patient’s clinical health, and is also uncorrelated 
with donor status (living versus deceased). These results suggest that the instrument meets the 
usual standards for validity, and confirms the idea that the receipt of perfectly matched kidneys is 
a random event.  
 Table 2.6 reports the IV estimates. The instrument is strongly correlated with 30 day 
volume in the first stage, and the first stage F-stat is well above the usual threshold of 10 for 
instrument strength. For reference, I also report the fixed effects estimates from Table 2.3. In 
order to improve the precision of the estimates, I include all covariates in these regressions. The 
IV estimates are not statistically different from zero. In addition, the IV estimates for one week  
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Table 2.5: Correlation between Instrument and Covariates 
Recipient Age -0.01440 Recipient Obese -0.00085 Donor Age -0.01881
(0.058) (0.002) (0.068)
Recipient Female -0.00351* BMI Missing 0.00025 Donor: Female -0.00458**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Recipient Black -0.00149 On Dialysis -0.00012 Donor: Black -0.00057
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Recipient White 0.00079 In Hospital -0.00042 Donor: White -0.00118
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Recipient Hispanic -0.00030 Poor Functional Status -0.00051 Donor: Hispanic 0.00121
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Recipient Other Race 0.00100 Functional Status Missing -0.00044 Donor: Other Race 0.00054
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary Insurer: Medicare 0.00004
Glomerular Filtration Rate (GFR) at 
Transplant -0.02553 Donor: Living 0.00233
(0.002) (0.096) (0.002)
Primary Insurer: Medicaid -0.00157* Stage 5 Kidney Disease 0.00074 Donor: Living, No Waitlist 0.00058
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Primary Insurer: Private 0.00201 GFR / Kidney Disease Stage Missing -0.00075 HLA Mismatches -0.00351
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Primary Insurer: Other -0.00048 Recipient Sensitized (PRA > 19%) -0.00036 Days Waiting -1.78321
(0.000) (0.001) (2.482)
High School or Less 0.00003 PRA Value Missing 0.00069 Donor: Expanded Criteria 0.00011
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Education Status Missing -0.00167 Primary Diagnosis: Diabetes -0.00267 Donor: Local to Recipient 0.00144
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
College or Higher 0.00164
Primary Diagnosis: Hypertensive 
Nephroscelerosis 0.00208
(0.002) (0.001)
Primary Diagnosis: Glomerular Disease 0.00111
(0.001)
Primary Diagnosis: Polycystic Kidneys 0.00048
(0.001)
Primary Diagnosis: Other -0.00100
(0.002)
Primary Diagnosis: Missing -0.00060
(0.001)
Previous Kidney Transplant -0.00063
(0.001)
Notes:
1. Table displays the results from 43 separate regressions. Each covariate was regressed on 30 day volume of perfect match kidneys (the 
IV), and the set of transplant center-year dummies. The table displays the 43 estimates of the correlation between the covariates and the IV.
2. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level)
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Patient Demographics Patient Clinical Information Donor / Transplant Characteritsics
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         Table 2.6: Instrumental Variables Estimates 
A. Post-Transplant Graft 
Failure
FE IV-FE FE IV-FE FE IV-FE
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00103** -0.00046 -0.00137** -0.00108 -0.00120 -0.00061
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007)
First Stage F-Stat 426.8 426.8 426.8
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.062 0.062
B. Post-Transplant Patient 
Mortality
FE IV-FE FE IV-FE FE IV-FE
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00016 0.00023 -0.00042 -0.00192 -0.00072 -0.00230
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
First Stage F-Stat 426.8 426.8 426.8
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.032 0.032 0.056 0.056
C. Return to Dialysis Within 
One Week FE IV-FE
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) 0.00032 -0.01593*
(0.001) (0.010)
First Stage F-Stat 426.8
Observations 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.177 0.174
D. GFR at Discharge FE IV-FE
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.04068 -0.11882
(0.074) (0.755)
First Stage F-Stat 292.4
Observations 83,872 83,872
R-squared 0.276 0.276
Notes:
1. The table displays both the fixed effects estimates (re-reported from Table 2.3) and the IV-FE estimates of the 
effect of a one percent increase in 30 day volume on each of the eight outcome variables. The full set of covariates 
are included in each of the regressions. 
2. In the first stage, log of 30 day volume is regressed on the IV (number of perfect match kidneys), the full set of 
covariates, and the set of transplant center-by-year dummy variables. The first stage F-statistic is reported above. 
3. The sample size in panel D is smaller because a number of observations have missing information on pre-
transplant GFR, which is included as a regressor in the specification where GFR at discharge is the outcome of
interest.
4. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level)
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
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and one month graft failure are smaller in magnitude than the fixed effects estimates, which 
contradicts the expectation that the fixed effects estimates understate the volume effect. 
However, this may be due a local treatment effect; the compliers of the IV may have, on average, 
different characteristics than the sample as a whole. This may be the case if some transplant 
centers are more likely than others to receive perfectly matched kidneys, and the patients at these 
centers have different characteristics than the full population of transplant recipients. Whatever 
the case, the IV estimates confirm the notion that the observed volume-outcome relationship in 
kidney transplantation is largely due to between hospital differences, rather than to a volume 
effect, as would be predicted by the “practice makes perfect” hypothesis.  
 
2.7.6 Effects by Transplant Center Size and Age 
 The fixed effects estimates suggest that the “practice makes perfect” hypothesis does not 
fully explain the volume-outcome relationship in kidney transplantation. However, a volume 
effect may persist for transplant centers with certain characteristics, and these effects may be 
“swamped” using the full sample of observations. In particular, one might expect a stronger 
volume effect among lower volume transplant centers. These centers have less accumulated 
experience than higher volume transplant centers, so an increase in 30 day volume may have a 
beneficial effect among these centers. That is, an increase in 30 day volume may have zero effect 
at a larger transplant center with much more experience transplanting kidneys. Therefore, I re-
estimate the fixed effects estimates based on tercile of transplant center average of 30 day 
volume (these are the same terciles used in Table 2.1).  
 Table 2.7 reports the fixed effects estimates, broken out by tercile of center average 30 
day volume. In order to improve the precision of the estimates, I include all covariates in each of 
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the regressions. For graft failure, it appears that the volume effect is stronger at lower volume 
transplants centers (in the first tercile) than at higher volume transplant centers (in the second 
and third terciles). The volume effect is statistically significant for lower volume transplant 
centers at one week and one month post transplant, but is statistically insignificant one year post 
transplant. These results suggest that most of the volume effect for one week and one month 
graft failure in the full sample is concentrated at lower volume transplant centers. This is an 
interesting result. Under the selective referral hypothesis, the reason that lower volume transplant 
centers may perform fewer transplants is that they may be lower quality providers, and therefore 
patients are discouraged from receiving their care at these centers. If lower volume transplant 
centers are in fact lower quality providers, then it appears that they are able to offset this 
disadvantage (with respect to patient outcomes) by performing additional transplants.  
 Unexpectedly, the volume effect appears to be stronger at higher volume transplant 
centers with respect to patient mortality, although the estimates are imprecisely estimated. The 
results suggest that a 10 percent increase in 30 day volume decreases the probability of one week 
patient mortality by 1.6 percentage points for patients that are transplanted at higher volume 
transplant centers. It is not immediately clear why such a volume effect would be present at 
higher volume centers and not at lower volume centers, or why there is no apparent volume 
effect at higher volume centers with respect to post transplant graft failure. One potential 
explanation is that patients who are transplanted at higher volume centers are, on average, sicker 
than the full sample of transplant recipients. The pooled OLS results indirectly confirm this 
notion. In that case, it may by that the effect of an increase in transplant volume manifests itself 
differently at different transplant centers because of patient and donor heterogeneity across
Table 2.7: Fixed Effects Estimates by Tercile of Volume 
A. Post-Transplant Graft Failure
First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile
Center Volume in Previous 30 days (Log) -0.00110** -0.00106 0.00120 -0.00147** -0.00160 0.00294 -0.00136 -0.00092 0.00281
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 39,257 38,855 39,025 39,257 38,855 39,025 39,257 38,855 39,025
R-squared 0.051 0.031 0.019 0.054 0.037 0.024 0.076 0.060 0.051
B. Post-Transplant Patient Mortality
First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile
Center Volume in Previous 30 days (Log) -0.00012 -0.00016 -0.00156** -0.00040 -0.00014 -0.00197 -0.00085 0.00097 -0.00304
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 39,257 38,855 39,025 39,257 38,855 39,025 39,257 38,855 39,025
R-squared 0.042 0.022 0.010 0.048 0.032 0.017 0.074 0.053 0.042
C. Return to Dialysis Within One Week First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile
Center Volume in Previous 30 days (Log) 0.00030 0.00022 0.00119
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006)
Observations 39,257 38,855 39,025
R-squared 0.189 0.174 0.165
D. GFR at Discharge First Tercile Second Tercile Third Tercile
Center Volume in Previous 30 days (Log) -0.01887 -0.05251 -0.85904*
(0.079) (0.253) (0.506)
Observations 27,997 28,390 27,485
R-squared 0.278 0.272 0.280
Notes:
1. The table displays the fixed-effects estimates of the effect of a one percent increase in 30 day transplant volume on each of the eight outcome variables. Each regression 
includes the full set of covariates as regressors.
2. Terciles are calculated at transplant center level. For each transplant center in the estimation sample, I calculated average 30-day volume, and then took terciles based on that 
average. Therefore, each tercile has approximately the same number of transplants, but varying numbers of transplant centers. The transplant centers in the first tercile are, on 
average, lower volume transplant centers, for example. These terciles correspond to the terciles used in the reporting of descriptive statistics in Table 2.1.
3. The sample size in panel D is smaller because a number of observations have missing information on pre-transplant GFR, which is included as a regressor in the
specification where GFR at discharge is the outcome of interest
4. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level)
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
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transplant centers.  
 In addition to the size of the transplant center, the age of the transplant center may also 
determine whether an increase in transplant volume would cause the center to improve patient 
outcomes. Table 2.8 breaks down the transplants in the estimation sample by the year in which 
each transplant center in the sample opened. A very large percentage (84.1 percent) of 
transplants was performed at transplant centers that have been in operation since at least 1987.33 
Because these transplant centers have a large stock of accumulated experience to draw upon, the 
effect of performing one more transplant may be zero. That is, these centers may already be on 
the flat of their learning curves, so variation in 30 day volume has no effect on patient outcomes. 
“Younger” transplant centers, however, may truly be learning by doing, and therefore the volume 
effect may be stronger at relatively newer transplant programs.  
In order to test this hypothesis, I re-estimate the fixed effects estimations on two 
subgroups. The “younger” subgroup includes transplants performed at centers that were opened 
after 1987 (81 transplant centers), and the “established” group includes transplants performed at 
transplant centers that have been open since at least 1987 (161 transplant centers). Table 2.9 
presents the results. Contrary to expectations, it appears that with respect to one week and one 
month graft failure, the volume effect is larger (and statistically significant) at more established  
transplant programs. There is no apparent volume effect with respect to patient mortality among 
either of the two subgroups of transplant centers. While these results are difficult to reconcile 
against the notion that younger transplant programs would benefit more from an increase in 
volume, there may be unobserved characteristics between these two subgroups of transplant 
centers that explain why the volume effect (with respect to graft failure) is stronger at more 
                                                 
33 As the note in the Table describes, the UNOS STAR data begins in 1987. Therefore, the earliest that I observe a 
transplant center performing a transplant is 1987.   
84 
 
Table 2.8: Estimation Sample by Year of Transplant Center Opening 
Year of Opening Number of Centers Number of Transplants Pct. Of Transplants Cumm. Percentage
1987 or before 162 98,488 84.1% 84.1%
1988 14 4,019 3.4% 87.5%
1989 12 3,682 3.1% 90.7%
1990 10 3,152 2.7% 93.3%
1991 5 694 0.6% 93.9%
1992 2 891 0.8% 94.7%
1993 3 424 0.4% 95.1%
1994 4 335 0.3% 95.3%
1995 1 25 0.0% 95.4%
1996 4 377 0.3% 95.7%
1997 6 1,193 1.0% 96.7%
1998 0 0 0.0% 96.7%
1999 10 2,170 1.9% 98.6%
2000 3 755 0.6% 99.2%
2001 0 0 0.0% 99.2%
2002 2 146 0.1% 99.3%
2003 0 0 0.0% 99.3%
2004 3 766 0.7% 100.0%
2005 2 20 0.0% 100.0%
243 117,137
Notes:
1. The table displays the year in which each transplant center in the estimation sample opened. For example, of the 117,137
transplants performed between 1996 and 2005, 98,488 were performed at the 162 transplant centers that opened in 1987 or 
before. The UNOS STAR data begins in 1987, so the exact year of opening is unknown for centers whose first tranplant
is observed in the data duirng 1987. 
2. The estimation sample begins in 1996. The table shows that 10 transplant centers opened between 1996 and 2005, 
performing 5,427 transplants or 4.6% of the number of transplants in the estimation sample  
 
established transplant programs. If these programs also experience higher rates of staff turnover 
(as compared to younger programs), then at any given point in time, the staff may not be as 
experienced as might be implied by the date the program opened. In this scenario, there may 
exist positive benefits of performing more transplants on patient outcomes even at more 
established programs. More work is needed to document the exact differences in these programs 
that may explain the results in Table 2.9. 
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2.7.7 Depreciation of Experience in Kidney Transplantation 
 As discussed earlier, one of the motivations for using 30 day volume as a measure of 
recent experience, as opposed to other “lookback” windows, is that there appears to be rapid 
depreciation of experience in kidney transplantation. Here I present the fixed effects estimates of 
the volume effect from specifications where I include lagged terms of 30 day volume. If volume 
in the 31 to 60 days (or 61 to 90 days) prior to a patient’s transplant affects current outcomes, 
then the coefficients on the lagged terms should be negative and statistically significant. That is, 
holding constant 30 day volume, does the experience in the 31 to 60 (and 61 to 90) days prior to 
a patient’s transplant have any marginal benefit on transplant center performance?34 Table 2.10  
presents the results of these regressions. For brevity, I only include the results for graft failure 
rates, since that is where any evidence of a volume effect is isolated. For reference, I report the 
fixed effects estimates from table 2.3 in the first column of table 2.10. The coefficients on the 
lagged terms in the second and third columns are both economically and statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that only very recent volume, measured by 30 day volume, affects 
short term graft failure rates, and that this experience does not carry over into the future. In 
additional regressions (not reported here), I also re-estimate the fixed effects equations using a 
60 day measure of volume, and again using a 90 day measure of volume. In these specifications, 
the volume effect is not statistically different from zero. Taken together, these results suggest 
that experience depreciates rather quickly in kidney transplantation, and that the 30 day measure 
of recent volume is more appropriate than longer “lookback” windows.  
 
 
 
                                                 
34 This approach is similar to the one used in Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt (2005), although the motivation for sing it is 
not exactly the same.    
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Table 2.9: Fixed Effects Estimates by Age of Transplant Center 
A. Post-Transplant Graft 
Failure
"Younger" "Established" "Younger" "Established" "Younger" "Established"
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00049 -0.00135** -0.00025 -0.00204** -0.00042 -0.00169
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 18,649 98,488 18,649 98,488 18,649 98,488
R-squared 0.047 0.031 0.055 0.035 0.074 0.060
B. Post-Transplant Patient 
Mortality
"Younger" "Established" "Younger" "Established" "Younger" "Established"
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) 0.00022 -0.00039 -0.00030 -0.00048 -0.00049 -0.00087
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 18,649 98,488 18,649 98,488 18,649 98,488
R-squared 0.042 0.023 0.053 0.027 0.071 0.054
C. Return to Dialysis Within 
One Week "Younger" "Established"
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.00113 0.00123
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 18,649 98,488
R-squared 0.190 0.174
D. GFR at Discharge "Younger" "Established"
Center Volume in Previous 
30 days (Log) -0.01473 -0.06007
(0.121) (0.095)
Observations 13,651 70,221
R-squared 0.327 0.267
Notes:
1. The table displays the fixed-effects estimates of the effect of a one percent increase in 30 day transplant volume 
on each of the eight outcome variables. Each regression includes controls for patient demographics, patient clinical 
information, and donor/transplant characteristics.
2. "Younger" transplant centers are those that opened after 1987. "Established" transplant centers are those that 
opened in 1987 at the latest. 
3. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level)
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
One Week Post TX One Month Post TX One Year Post TX
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      Table 2.10: Depreciation of Experience 
A: One Week Graft Failure
Center Volume in Previous 30 days (Log) -0.00103** -0.00103** -0.00104**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Center Volume in Previous 31 - 60 days (Log) -0.00012 -0.00013
(0.000) (0.000)
Center Volume in Previous 61 - 90 days (Log) -0.00026
(0.000)
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.034
B. One Month Graft Failure
Center Volume in Previous 30 days (Log) -0.00137** -0.00136** -0.00136**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Center Volume in Previous 31 - 60 days (Log) 0.00042 0.00042
(0.000) (0.000)
Center Volume in Previous 61 - 90 days (Log) -0.00019
(0.001)
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.038
C.  One Year Graft Failure
Center Volume in Previous 30 days (Log) -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00118
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Center Volume in Previous 31 - 60 days (Log) -0.00006 -0.00003
(0.001) (0.001)
Center Volume in Previous 61 - 90 days (Log) 0.00066
(0.001)
Observations 117,137 117,137 117,137
R-squared 0.062 0.062 0.062
Notes:
1. Each regression includes controls for patient demographics, patient clinical information,
and donor/transplant characteristics.
2. For reference, the fixed effects estimates from Table 2.3 are reported in the first column.
3. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year 
level).
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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2.8 Policy Implications 
 How should the kidney transplant community utilize this analysis with regard to policy? 
The strong implication of the “practice makes perfect” hypothesis is that care could be 
concentrated at any hospital or provider and outcomes would improve through the volume effect. 
If this is true, then redundancies in care can be eliminated, and patient outcomes would improve. 
The results of this analysis are not clear-cut with respect to the regionalization of kidney 
transplants. First, it appears that much of the observed volume-outcome relationship documented 
by Axelrod et al (2004) is due to between hospital differences in the quality and processes of 
care that explain both differences in transplant volume and patient outcomes. However, with 
regard to graft failure, there does appear to be a causal volume effect, although it is limited to the 
short run. Second, the results suggest that most of the volume effect on graft failure is 
concentrated at lower volume transplant programs. There is also evidence of a volume effect on 
short term (one week) patient mortality that is concentrated at higher volume transplant 
programs. 
 If lower volume transplant programs were closed, and patients were instead directed to 
higher volume transplant programs, then the results suggest that rates of graft failure would not 
improve, but that rates of short term patient mortality would decrease. Of course, these 
improvements in short term patient mortality would have to be weighed against any reductions in 
patient access to care that may arise from regionalization of care. In addition, any price effects 
generated by a reduction in competition would need to be accounted for as well. One possibility 
would be to eliminate smaller transplant programs within urban areas in which there are already 
other transplant programs. Therefore, patients within a particular urban area (or who are already 
traveling to a particular urban area for care) would experience minimal disutility that would arise 
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from restricted access to care, but may realize improved outcomes by being transplanted at 
higher volume transplant centers. A challenge to this approach is defining the exact volume 
threshold that would be used to make regionalization decisions. While this paper documents 
heterogeneous volume effects by average transplant center size, it is outside the scope of the 
current analysis to derive optimal thresholds for regionalization of care.  
 In addition, the results of this analysis have implications for the public reporting of 
transplant center volume and outcomes. As discussed, patients or their doctors may utilize the 
published SRTR reports to infer the quality of transplant centers in the patient’s choice set. One 
drawback of the SRTR reports is that it statistically compares the actual patient outcomes at a 
particular transplant center to the expected outcomes, based on a statistical model. However, for 
lower volume transplant centers, average actual outcomes (like the one year mortality rate of 
transplant recipients) will be “noisier” because they are based on smaller sample sizes. 
Therefore, in a statistical sense, it is harder to reject the null hypothesis that a lower volume 
transplant center’s outcomes are worse than the national average, even if they actually are in 
reality. If this is true, then patients may overestimate the quality of care performed at lower 
volume transplant centers. If volume is directly related to the underlying quality of a transplant 
program, then perhaps simply reporting transplant center volume would provide sufficient 
information about the quality of a transplant program. This may lead patients and their doctors to 
“selectively avoid” lower volume, and thus lower quality, transplant programs. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 This paper tests whether there is a volume effect in kidney transplantation. Identification 
of the volume effect comes from supply shocks of transplantable kidneys from the local donor 
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supply that are plausibly exogenous with respect to unobserved determinants of patient 
outcomes. Indeed, conditional on transplant center-by-year fixed effects, transplant center 
volume in the 30 days leading up to a patient’s transplant appears to be uncorrelated with many 
of observable factors of patient outcomes. However, because there is correlation between 30 day 
volume and donor status (deceased versus living), I also estimate IV regressions that use 
perfectly matched kidneys, considered to be a random event, to predict 30 day volume in the first 
stage. The results suggest that much of the observed volume-outcome association in kidney 
transplantation is due to between hospital differences that are correlated with both volume and 
outcomes, such as the quality of the transplant team. While this analysis is not an explicit “horse 
race” between the “practice makes perfect” and “selective referral” hypotheses, the results are 
not generally supportive of the idea that practice makes perfect. While there appears to be a 
volume effect for graft failure in the short run, it appears that much of that is concentrated among 
lower volume transplant centers. 
 The results presented here are qualitatively similar to other volume-outcome studies in 
the health economics and health services research literature. In particular, it appears that across a 
variety of procedures, much of the volume-outcome relationship demonstrated in the medical 
literature is not explained by the practice makes perfect hypothesis. This is not a universal result; 
learning by doing may be present in other procedures and contexts. But the findings of this paper 
and others like it suggest that more attention should be paid to between provider differences to 
explain variation in patient outcomes. This paper, like others, fails to document specific 
differences between hospitals, such as processes of care, availability of advanced technology, 
and the training of staff, that may explain the differences in outcomes of patients that are treated 
at higher or lower volume hospitals. Additional research is needed to identify these attributes, 
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and the medical community should consider the sharing of best practices so that hospitals with 
worse patient outcomes can learn how to improve their performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Impact of Temporal Breaks on the Delivery of Healthcare: Evidence from Kidney 
Transplantation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 A number of articles in the health economics and health services research literature have 
tested whether healthcare providers “learn by doing,” in which experience – usually measured by 
procedural volume – affects patient outcomes. The previous chapter provides a review of this 
literature, and adds to the literature by testing for a volume effect in the context of kidney 
transplantation. The available evidence suggests that little of the observed volume-outcome 
relationship in healthcare can be explained by the learning by doing hypothesis. That is, there 
does not appear to be a causal effect of performing one more procedure on improved patient 
outcomes. However, recent work in the area has focused on the role that human capital 
depreciation and organizational forgetting play in healthcare. The former, often simply called 
“forgetting”, suggests that individual workers maintain a level of skill through repetition of tasks, 
and that human capital depreciates during breaks or interruptions in the production schedule. 
Organizational forgetting can arise from the human capital depreciation among all workers 
within a firm, through worker turnover, or from changes in the production processes that affect 
worker productivity.  
 This chapter relates the concepts of human capital depreciation and organizational 
forgetting in the context of kidney transplantation. In particular, I test whether breaks in the 
production schedule for transplant centers, measured by the number of elapsed days between 
transplants, negatively affect patient outcomes. If repetition prevents the depreciation of the 
skills of the transplant team, then longer gaps of time between transplants may have negative 
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affects on the outcomes of the patients that are treated after these breaks. If this is the case, then 
repetition of tasks may help healthcare providers “learn by not forgetting.” That is, if transplant 
teams are already at or near the flat of their learning curve, then repetition keeps them near the 
flat, and temporal breaks in production temporarily moves them away from this minimum, 
generating worse patient outcomes.  
 The identification strategy in this chapter is similar to the one used in the previous 
chapter. Because the majority of kidney transplants are performed using kidneys from deceased 
donors, and the timing of the arrival of these kidneys at a transplant center is unpredictable, then 
the gap of time between any two transplants is plausibly exogenously determined. That is, the 
number of days since a transplant center has performed its last transplant should be uncorrelated 
with unobserved patient or donor characteristics that affect patient outcomes. The challenge lies 
in the fact that living donor transplants are scheduled procedures, and they make up rough one-
third of all transplants performed. The scheduling of living donor transplants may “smooth” the 
transplant center’s production schedule, which could lead to biased regression estimates.35 I find 
distinct evidence that living donor transplants often occur after longer breaks in the production 
schedule, and in particular, are scheduled for particular days of the week at some transplant 
centers. While I am able to directly control for donor status (living versus deceased), living 
donor transplant recipients, and/or their donors, may be healthier in unobserved ways that affect 
patient outcomes. This correlation would lead to negatively biased estimates of the effect of 
breaks in the production schedule on transplant recipient outcomes.  
                                                 
35 In addition, the scheduling of living donor transplants may reduce the amount of variation in temporal breaks 
within a given transplant center in a given year. However, there appears to be sufficient variation in the size of 
temporal breaks within a transplant center in given year to plausibly identify the effects of temporal breaks on 
transplant recipients’ outcomes.  
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 Additionally, the length of the temporal breaks may have a nonlinear effect on 
productivity, as measured by patient outcomes. For example, it may be possible to perform “too 
many, too soon.” This may be especially true at smaller transplant centers with a smaller 
transplant staff; performing transplants too close to one another may lead to fatigue among the 
transplant team members, for example. On the other hand, the marginal effect of an increase in 
the length of the temporal break between transplants may diminish after a particular point in the 
temporal break distribution. Following Hockenberry, Lien, and Chou (2008), I use a dummy 
variable scheme to flexibly test for nonlinearities in the gradient of the effect of temporal breaks 
in the production schedule on patient outcomes. 
 Finally, I test whether the level of transplant center experience, measured by recent 
transplant volume, before the temporal break mitigates any negative productivity effects 
generated by the elapsed number of days between transplants. In this scenario, high volume 
transplant centers with larger stocks of overall experience may be less likely to “forget” during 
temporal breaks, as compared to lower volume transplant centers with lower levels of 
accumulated experience. If lower volume centers are more prone to depreciation of skills that 
arise from temporal breaks, then a case can be made for centralizing kidney transplants at higher 
volume transplant centers.  
 The empirical results do not generally support the hypothesis that temporal breaks 
between transplants affect the productivity of transplant centers, as measured by the conditional 
graft failure rates of patients transplanted immediately following the break. In models where the 
size of the temporal break is interacted with the measure of recent transplant center experience, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative, which indicates that higher levels of 
transplant experience mitigate the deleterious effects that arise from temporal breaks between 
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transplants. However, much of this association appears to be concentrated at the lower end of the 
temporal break distribution. An unexpected result is that relatively long temporal breaks do not 
seem to have any impact on productivity (patient outcomes) upon return to production, which is 
where one would expect an effect. I confirm these results using the subsample of transplant 
recipients that receive their kidneys from deceased donors. As expected, the randomness of 
arrivals of deceased donor kidneys from the local donor supply appears to randomly assign 
temporal breaks among this population; observable patient, donor, and transplant characteristics 
are largely uncorrelated with the size of temporal breaks. Despite the apparent randomness of 
temporal breaks at transplant centers (especially for deceased donor kidney recipients), there still 
may exist unobserved heterogeneity that may explain why I cannot identify an effect of temporal 
breaks on transplant center productivity. First, as I discuss later in the chapter, there may be non-
random sorting of surgeons or staff along unobserved dimensions of ability that is correlated 
with the size of temporal breaks.  Second, I cannot observe the activities of the members of the 
transplant team during breaks between transplants. If members of the transplant staff perform 
productive activities during the days between transplants, these activities may offset any kind of 
depreciation of skills that would have otherwise occurred.   
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes some of the 
literature pertaining to organizational forgetting, the depreciation of experience, and the impacts 
of temporal breaks on productivity. The third section describes the data and construction of the 
estimation sample. Before turning to the empirical strategy, I focus on the distribution of 
temporal breaks in the sample, and document evidence of scheduling of living donor transplants 
at transplant centers in the sample. With that background, I next present the empirical strategy 
and describe the estimating equations. The estimation results follow, first for the full sample, and 
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then for the subsample of deceased donor recipients. I then describe alternative measures and 
methods that I employed, all of which yielded similar results. After a discussion of the results, 
the last section concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2. Human Capital Depreciation and Organizational Forgetting 
 Previous studies in the labor economics literature have addressed the idea that human 
capital depreciates when a worker is out of the productive workforce for some period of time. 
Using panel data, Mincer and Ofek (1982) document that “reentry wages” are statistically lower 
than wages at the time of labor force exit for women in their sample, and that the decrease in 
wages is proportional to the amount of time that the woman spent out of the workforce. They 
interpret these results as evidence of human capital depreciation; if wages proxy for actual 
productivity, then longer work interruptions lead to higher levels of depreciation, and thus lower 
wages upon reentry into the workforce. However, the authors do not directly observe worker 
productivity. 
 In experimental settings, forgetting has been demonstrated even in the simplest of tasks. 
Globerson, Levin, and Shtub (1989) recruited subjects to perform computer data entry. At 
baseline, each subject entered the data from 16 personnel records into a computer database. 
Subjects were then invited back after randomly assigned breaks and asked to repeat the task. 
Breaks between data entry episodes ranged from as little as one day for some subjects, and up to 
82 days for others. The results suggest that the subjects became more efficient between the first 
and sixteen repetitions. After the break, however, subjects had decreased productivity (measured 
by time to completion), and the level of forgetting was proportional to the length of the break. 
Bailey (1989) documented similar results when subjects were tasked with the assembly and 
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disassembly of Erector Sets. As Hockenberry, Lien, and Chou (2008) point out, if the subjects in 
these studies exhibit significant forgetting when performing relatively routine and low skill tasks, 
then the impact of production breaks may have a stronger effect for high skill tasks like surgery.  
 Probably the best known paper on organizational forgetting is Argote, Beckman, and 
Epple (1990) which tests for the level of depreciation of knowledge in the building of World War 
II Liberty Ships. They estimate that only 3.2 percent of the stock of production knowledge at the 
beginning of a production year persisted until the end of the year. Subsequent research by 
Thompson (2001) on the Liberty Ship experience has shown that the results of the original paper 
are sensitive to the inclusion of measures of capital investment. Changes in stock of capital 
available to workers will alter their productivity, and create biased estimates of the depreciation 
of human capital (at the firm level) if ignored. Benkard (2000) estimates similar regressions as 
Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990) in the case of aircraft manufacturing and finds that 61 
percent of the firm’s stock of experience survives through the calendar year.  
The drawback of these studies is that they fail to identify exactly how an organization 
“forgets.” One possibility is that the depreciation of experience at the firm level is simply a 
reflection of the depreciation of human capital of the individual workers within the firm. Another 
possibility is that worker turnover generates depreciation in experience at the level of the firm. In 
this case, human capital may not necessarily depreciate, but firm productivity suffers when 
experienced workers leave the firm, and are replaced by new workers that must learn the skills of 
the job. Finally, as pointed out by Thompson (2001) and Benkard (2000), the firm may either 
change its capital level over time, or the production process itself may change. In the former, 
workers may become more productive, although there may be a period of decreased productivity 
as workers learn how to operate the new capital. The latter explanation is similar in nature. A 
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change in the production process may cause temporary decreases in worker productivity as 
workers adapt to the new process. Benkard (2000) even documents anecdotal evidence of the 
reluctance of aircraft manufacturing officials to alter production processes out of concern that 
such changes would disrupt workers’ routines and lead to lower levels of productivity.36 
Studies in the health economics and health services research literature have offered 
extensions of the lines of research described above. One way in which the health literature is 
different, though, is in its definition of “productivity.” Typically, worker productivity is 
measured by the amount of time he or she takes to complete a task, or by the number of workers 
needed to produce a given level of output. In the health literature, the productivity of a provider 
is usually defined as her ability to “produce” improved patient outcomes, or as Hockenberry, 
Lien, and Chou (2008) put it, her ability to “extend life.” That is, the surgeon with the quickest 
average time in the operating room may not necessarily be the most productive surgeon if her 
patients experience adverse events like surgical complications or mortality. However, using this 
altered definition of productivity still allows for a parallel to be drawn between learning and 
forgetting in healthcare, compared to other industries and settings. 
For example, Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town (2006) estimate the extent to which 
experience depreciates from one quarter to the next for hospitals performing three surgical 
procedures, with respect to inpatient mortality. They find significant heterogeneity in their 
estimates of knowledge depreciation across the three procedures, although it should be noted that 
their depreciation parameters were estimated assuming that hospital volume is exogenously 
determined. Given the discussion of selective referral and patient selection in the last chapter, 
volume is likely endogenous, which would lead to bias in their depreciation estimates.  
                                                 
36 As pointed out by Brachet and David (2009), the practical issue at hand is the availability of data at the level of 
the worker, as well as availability of data at the firm level on job turnover. Without these data, the underlying 
mechanism that explains organizational forgetting cannot be identified.  
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More recently, Huesch (2009) examines patterns of learning and forgetting among “new” 
cardiac surgeons in Florida. If there is learning and depreciation of human capital, it might be 
most profound for workers (surgeons) who have recently completed their training (medical 
school residency). He finds no evidence of learning, and that experience almost fully depreciates 
from one quarter to the next. The advantage of his paper is that he tests for forgetting at the 
individual worker lever, rather than that at the level of the firm (hospital).  
Using individual and firm level data, Brachet and David (2009) are able to test which 
mechanisms lead to organizational forgetting in the provision of emergency medical services. In 
particular, they estimate organizational experience at the beginning of the year is depreciated by 
approximately 75 percent by the end of the year. In addition, they find that labor turnover is 
responsible for 62 percent of the organizational forgetting, and that human capital depreciation 
accounts for the remaining 38 percent. Lastly, they test whether breaks in production (at the 
individual level) is a pathway through which human capital depreciates. They find that an 
increase in the number of days between emergency calls for an emergency technician leads to a 
small, yet statistically significant, increase in the response and delivery time needed to get a 
patient to the hospital. The institutional setting lends credibility to their study, as the number and 
timing of emergency calls are difficult to predict, meaning that temporal breaks between 
emergency calls are plausibly exogenously determined.  
Finally, Hockenberry, Lien, and Chou (2008) find that breaks in the production schedules 
of cardiac surgeons in Taiwan lead to negative outcomes for patients, measured by one month 
mortality. A drawback of the study, however, is that the nature of the breaks is poorly 
understood. Unlike in Brachet and David (2009), where breaks in the production schedule can be 
explained by demand shocks for emergency care, temporal distance between surgeries for 
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cardiac surgeons may not be exogenous. For example, a surgeon may schedule a break in his or 
her operating schedule to attend a professional conference. If this is the case, the break in 
production is endogenous, and is directly related to investment in human capital. On the other 
hand, if a surgeon has a negative patient outcome, he or she may be placed on leave while the 
incident is investigated. However, the results from both Hockenberry Lien, and Chou (2008) and 
Brachet and David (2009) imply that temporal breaks may plausibly have an effect on the 
productivity of workers in the healthcare industry, which serves as motivation for investigating 
the issue in the context of kidney transplantation in this chapter.  
This review of the literature highlights that there are many different, yet related studies 
on the topic of learning and forgetting, both at the firm and the worker level, across a variety of 
industries. This paper falls in line with other papers that examine these issues in the healthcare 
industry. Therefore, the definition of “productivity” used here will be improved patient 
outcomes, rather than lower costs or improved speed at a production task.37 Second, because the 
data available are at the transplant center level, this analysis is at the organizational level. I do 
not observe surgeon identifiers. However, because transplantation is very much a team-oriented 
process, and patient outcomes dependent on the collective skills of the team, it seems appropriate 
to keep the analysis at the transplant center level. Finally, the goal of this paper is test whether 
breaks in the schedule of a transplant center lead to worse performance following a break. 
Therefore, I do not estimate depreciation factors, as in Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town (2006), 
Huesch (2009), or Brachet and David (2009). The empirical approach is similar to that of 
Hockenberry, Lien, and Chou (2008), although I argue that the nature of kidney transplantation 
and the random arrival of transplantable kidneys lends itself to a more credible research design. 
 
                                                 
37 More accurately, productivity in this chapter is defined as the absence of a negative patient outcome.  
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3.3 Data and Estimation Sample 
 The data used in this chapter come from the United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) 
Standard Transplant Analysis and Research Files (STAR) on all kidney waitlist, transplant, and 
follow-up activity as of August 2008. The estimation sample is similar to the one used in the 
previous chapter, but there are some differences, which I outline here.  
The key explanatory variable is the number of days between transplants at a given 
transplant center. More explicitly, this variable is defined at the patient level, and is equal to the 
number of days since the patient’s transplant center performed its last transplant. I do not observe 
the exact time of day that a transplant was performed, so I cannot define “time since last 
transplant” any more precisely that at the level of the calendar day. There are days in which in a 
transplant center performs multiple transplants. In these instances, each patient is assigned the 
number of days since the transplant center’s last transplant that did not occur on the same day of 
the patient.38 Therefore, the minimum temporal breaks is equal to one day.39 As discussed 
earlier, I do not observe which members of the transplant team are involved with a particular 
transplant, so I cannot estimate the impact of temporal breaks at the level of individual (surge
nurse, anesthesiologist, etc). In the sample, there were some extreme values of the number days 
since the transplant center performed its last transplant. To ensure that the results are not 
generated by these extreme values, I drop observations where it has been greater than 30 da
since the transplant center performed its last transplant. This drops 3,905 transplants from the
sample, which represent less than 3 percent of the entire s
on, 
ys 
 
ample. 
                                                 
38 For example, assume that a transplant center performs a transplant on May 1st, and then performs two transplants 
on May 4th. Then the two observations on May 4th would be coded as “3” for the number of days since the transplant 
center performed its last transplant.  
39 I also created an indicator variable for whether the transplant center performs another transplant on the same day 
that a patient receives her transplant. The inclusion of this variable into the estimating equations did not yield a 
statistically significant coefficient, and did not change the general findings. Therefore, I omit it from the analysis 
presented here and focus on the temporal breaks in the production schedule of the transplant center.  
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Because recent experience may help mitigate the depreciation of skills generated from 
temporal breaks in production, I also include a measure of recent transplant center volume. This 
is the same measure of volume used in the previous chapter: the natural log of 30 day transplant 
volume. For each transplant in the sample, I calculate the number of transplants performed at the 
recipient’s transplant center in the previous 30 days. In addition, I control for recent volume 
because the previous chapter showed that recent volume affects some patient outcomes. And 
since recent volume and the size of temporal breaks between transplants will be negatively 
correlated, excluding 30 day volume would generate biased estimates of the impact of temporal 
breaks on transplant center productivity.     
The patient outcome of interest in this chapter is graft failure, measured at various time 
periods post-transplant (one week, one month, and one year).  The results of the previous chapter 
suggest that a volume effect exists for short-term (one week and one month) graft failure, 
although this effect appears to be concentrated at lower volume transplant centers. Therefore, if 
there is evidence of learning for short-term graft failure, then this seem like a natural outcome to 
examine in order to identify any kind of organizational forgetting that may arise from temporal 
breaks in the production schedule of the transplant center. 
In order to adequately adjust for patient selection, I include controls for patient 
demographics, patient clinical information, and donor and transplant characteristics, which are 
defined in the previous chapter. The sample is restricted to adult transplant recipients (age 18 or 
older), because pediatric transplants are a specialized kind of transplant that are predominantly 
performed at pediatric hospitals. The sample is restricted to transplants that were performed 
between 1996 and 2005, and the final estimation sample includes 125,125 adult transplants 
performed at 243 transplant centers over the sample period.  
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3.4 Distribution of Temporal Breaks, and Scheduling of Living Donor Transplants 
 Before discussing the empirical strategy and estimating equations, I first turn to the 
distribution of temporal breaks in the estimation sample, which is displayed in Figure 3.1. There 
are two features to note. First, the distribution is heavily skewed. Because high volume transplant 
centers perform the majority of transplants in the sample, and because temporal breaks will be, 
on average, shorter at high volume transplant centers, there is a large number of observations at 
the lower end of the distribution. The mean temporal break is 5.54 days, and the median 
temporal break between transplants lasts 4 days.  
 The other feature of the distribution is the number of “spikes” that occur at multiples of 
seven. That is, there appears to be heaping of the data at 7 days, 14 days, 21 days, and so on. 
This suggests that there is some kind of weekly scheduling of transplants at transplant centers in 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
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the sample. One would expect that given the randomness in the arrivals of transplantable kidneys 
that the scheduling of a transplant is somewhat impossible. However, living donor transplants are 
scheduled procedures, and make up approximately one third of all kidney transplants. Therefore, 
the clustering of the data at multiples of seven days may reflect the scheduling of living donor 
transplants at particular days of the week.  
 Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of temporal breaks for living donor transplant 
recipients only. The spikes in the distribution are more pronounced in this subsample and are 
suggestive of scheduling. However, one would still expect that the randomness of the arrival of 
deceased donor kidneys at a transplant center to eliminate any kind of heaping of the data at 7, 
14, 21, etc. days for living donor recipients. This may be true for high volume transplant centers, 
but less so at lower volume transplant centers. That is, if living donor transplants are scheduled 
 
Figure 3.2 
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for particular days of the week, and low volume transplant centers experience large gaps in time 
between the arrivals of deceased donor kidneys from the local donor pool, then these spikes can 
be explained. 
 Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of temporal breaks for living donor recipients that have 
their transplant performed at a low volume transplant center, defined as being a transplant center 
in the lowest tercile of average annual transplant volume.40 Again, the distribution has 
pronounced spikes at multiples of seven. Figure 3.4 displays the distribution of temporal breaks 
for living donor recipients at high volume transplant centers. Because high volume centers 
perform more deceased donor transplants than lower volume centers, and do so more frequently, 
then one would expect less heaping of the data at particular values of the temporal breaks (at  
 
Figure 3.3 
                                                 
40 In order to classify transplant centers as low or high volume, I first calculated the average annual transplant 
volume of each transplant center in the sample. I then broke the sample into terciles, whereby the lowest tercile is 
made up of transplants performed at the lower volume transplant centers in the sample. Note that each tercile has 
(roughly) the equivalent number of observations, but the number of transplant centers in each tercile varies.  
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least in relation to low volume transplant centers). Figure 3.4 confirms this; there is less evidence 
of heaping for the living donor transplant recipients at high volume transplant centers. These 
results suggest that the temporal breaks experienced by living donor recipients are more 
predictable at low volume centers.  
 In contrast, Figure 3.5 displays the distribution of temporal breaks experienced by 
recipients of deceased donor kidneys. Because the arrivals of these kidneys are plausibly 
unpredictable, then there should not be any evidence of heaping of the data at particular values in 
the distribution. The figure confirms this; while the distribution is heavily skewed, it appears to 
be “smooth”, as expected. 
 Finally, the preceding analysis is predicated on the idea that transplant centers schedule 
their living donor transplants for particular days of the week. In order to detect this phenomenon, 
I calculated the exact day of the week that a transplant occurred. I tested whether the majority (at 
least 50 percent) of living donor transplants performed at a given transplant center occurred on 
one particular day of the week. I then repeated this exercise, using 75 percent as a cutoff. The 
results are presented in Table 3.1. Of the 243 transplant centers in the sample, 153 (63 percent) 
performed at least 50 percent of their living donor transplants on a particular day of the week, 
with Wednesday being the most popular day. Using the more restrictive cutoff (75 percent 
threshold), 73 transplant centers (30 percent) exhibited scheduling behavior, through which at 
least 75 percent of their living donor transplants were performed on a particular day of the week. 
As a contrast, this scheduling behavior is non-existent for deceased donor transplants, as 
expected.  
 The motivation behind these analyses is to get a better understanding of the variability 
and the distribution of temporal breaks in the sample. One might expect, ex ante, that breaks in  
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Table 3.1: Scheduling of Transplants on Particular Days of the Week 
Number of Centers Pct. Of Centers Number of Centers Pct. Of Centers
Sunday 0 0.0% Sunday 0 0.0%
Monday 13 5.3% Monday 0 0.0%
Tuesday 49 20.2% Tuesday 0 0.0%
Wednesday 54 22.2% Wednesday 0 0.0%
Thursday 33 13.6% Thursday 0 0.0%
Friday 4 1.6% Friday 0 0.0%
Saturday 0 0.0% Saturday 0 0.0%
153 63.0% 0 0.0%
Number of Centers Pct. Of Centers Number of Centers Pct. Of Centers
Sunday 0 0.0% Sunday 0 0.0%
Monday 8 3.3% Monday 0 0.0%
Tuesday 20 8.2% Tuesday 0 0.0%
Wednesday 29 11.9% Wednesday 0 0.0%
Thursday 16 6.6% Thursday 0 0.0%
Friday 0 0.0% Friday 0 0.0%
Saturday 0 0.0% Saturday 0 0.0%
73 30.0% 0 0.0%
Living Donor Transplants: > 50 Percent Performed On…
Living Donor Transplants: > 75 Percent Performed On…
Deceased Donor Transplants: > 50 Percent Performed On…
Deceased Donor Transplants: > 75 Percent Performed On…
 
the production schedules of transplant centers would be as good as randomly assigned, due to the 
randomness of arrivals of transplantable kidneys from the local donor supply. However, I have 
found distinct evidence of heaping of the data at particular values of temporal breaks, 
specifically in multiples of seven. This heaping appears to be generated by the scheduling of 
living donor transplants on particular days of the week, which presents an empirical challenge in 
identifying the true causal effect of temporal breaks on patient outcomes.     
 
3.5 Empirical Strategy 
 This paper tests whether temporal breaks in the production schedule of kidney transplant 
centers lead to lower levels of productivity after the break, as measured by patient outcomes. The 
preceding section dissects the distribution of temporal breaks in the sample, and indicates that 
temporal breaks may be correlated with both observable and unobservable patient or donor 
characteristics. With this in mind, I turn to the estimation strategy. 
 The general form of the estimating equation is: 
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(3.1) 0 1 2 3 4 5
Dem Clin Don
iht iht iht iht iht iht ht ihty Days Vol X X X Dβ β β β β β= + + + + + + +ξ  
 
where ihty  represents the outcome of transplant recipient i who received her transplant in year t at 
transplant center h. As is the previous chapter, DemihtX , , and 
Clin
ihtX
Don
ihtX  are vectors of patient 
demographic characteristics, patient clinical information, and donor characteristics, respectively. 
Recent experience is captured by , which the natural log of the number of transplants 
performed at transplant center h in the 30 days preceding recipient i’s transplant. The size of the 
temporal break in production experienced at transplant center h before recipient i’s transplant is 
captured by , which is the number of elapsed days since the transplant center’s last 
transplant.  is a set of transplant center-by-year fixed effects. Therefore, the identification of 
the effect of temporal breaks in production comes from comparing two otherwise identical 
transplant recipients that are transplanted at the same transplant center in the same year, but are 
transplanted following different temporal breaks in the transplant center’s production schedule.   
ihtVol
ihtDays
htD
 Entering the size of the temporal break as a continuous variable into equation 3.1 might 
not yield regression estimates that fully capture the effect of temporal breaks on productivity. 
First, ordinary least squares will yield an estimate that is based on deviations from the 
conditional mean of temporal breaks, which does not provide any information about the effect of 
temporal breaks at all points in the distribution. In particular, if the effect of a break in 
production is nonlinear in the size of the break, then simply entering the number days between 
transplants as a continuous variable will likely mask these effects. Second, the size of the 
temporal break is correlated with the probability of receiving a kidney from a living donor, as 
discussed in the previous section. The average temporal break lasts 5.54 days, and the median 
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break is 4 days. But living donor transplants appear to be clustered where the temporal break is 
7, 14, 21, etc. days, especially at low volume transplant centers. Therefore, living donor 
transplants are more likely to be performed after temporal breaks of above-average length. While 
I can directly control for donor status (living versus deceased), as well as for observable patient 
and donor characteristics, living donor transplant recipients and their donors may be healthier in 
unobserved ways, thus producing better outcomes. This would lead to negatively biased 
estimates (biased toward zero) of the effect of temporal breaks on patient outcomes. 
 In order to address these issues, I include dummy variables for various values of temporal 
breaks in the sample. The motivation for using dummy variables, rather than a continuous 
measure of temporal breaks, is that it allows me to detect effects along all points in the 
distribution. Also, I am able to directly control for transplants that are performed after temporal 
breaks of 7, 14, 21, etc. days, since these transplants are, on average, quite different than the 
transplants performed at other points in the distribution. Therefore, the primary estimating 
equation is given by: 
(3.2) 0 1 2 3 4'
Dem Clin Don
iht iht iht iht iht iht ht ihty iDays Vol X X X Dπ γ π π π π= + + + + + + +ξ  
which is similar to equation 3.1, except that a set of dummy variables ( ), replace the 
absolute number of days between transplants. I include indicator variables for the following 
values of the number of days since a transplant center’s last transplant: < 4 days, 4 days, 5-6 
days, 7 days, 8-13 days, 14 days, 15-20 days, 21 days, and > 21 days. The median temporal 
break is 4 days, and will serve as the reference group when I estimate equation 3.2. By explicitly 
including dummies for 7, 14, and 21 days, I partially address the fact that the transplants 
performed after these particular temporal breaks are more likely to be living donor transplants. 
Therefore, the estimated coefficients on these three dummy variables are likely to be negatively 
ihtiDays
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biased, but the coefficients on the indicators for the other points in the distribution are plausibly 
unbiased.41 
 The usual assumption is that the more frequently a provider performs a procedure (i.e. the 
smaller the temporal break), the more productive it will be in terms of patient outcomes. In 
theory, that assumption may not be completely valid. While most economists would agree that 
longer temporal breaks will lead to the depreciation of skills, it may also be the case that doing 
“too much, too soon” may lead to a higher rate of mistakes. This may be true in kidney 
transplantation, especially for low volume transplant centers with smaller transplant staffs. For 
example, if a transplant team performs transplants on consecutive days, it may become fatigued, 
which may lead to errors and worse patient outcomes. If this is true, then there may be an 
optimal temporal break (that is greater than zero) that balances the benefit of maintaining skills 
against the detriment caused by provider fatigue. Therefore, while one would assume that the 
coefficient on the < 4 days dummy variable to be negative (indicating improved patient 
outcomes), I argue that the expected sign is ambiguous. 
 I also estimate a version of equation 3.2 that includes interaction terms of recent 
experience (measured by 30 day volume) with the set of temporal break dummy variables. In the 
previous chapter, recent volume was shown to reduce the probability of short term graft failure, 
and short term patient mortality in some specifications. By interacting recent volume with the 
size of the temporal break, I am able to test whether the benefit of recent volume mitigates any 
                                                 
41 That is, relative to the reference group, who are transplanted after the medial temporal break of 4 days, patients 
that are transplanted after temporal breaks of <4 days, 5 or 6 days, 8 to 13 days, 15 to 20 days, and 22+ are alike in 
all ways that affect the probability of a negative outcomes expect for the fact that they are exposed to different 
temporal breaks. Those transplanted after temporal breaks of 7, 14, and 21 days are on average different than the 
observations in the reference group, primarily because they are more likely to  receive their kidneys from living 
donors.  
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deleterious effect that is created by temporal breaks between transplants. The estimating equation 
in this case is: 
(3.3) 0 1 2 3' ' x 
Dem Clin Don
iht iht iht iht iht iht iht iht ht ihty iDays iDays Vol Vol X X X D4α γ δ α α α α= + + + + + + + +ξ  
If higher levels of recent experience help protect a transplant center against any negative effects 
that arise from temporal breaks in its production schedule, then I expect that the coefficients on 
the interaction terms (the vector δ ) to be negative, which would  indicate a reduction in the 
probability of a negative outcome like graft failure or patient death. 
 In equations 3.2 and 3.3, I utilize variation in temporal breaks within a transplant center 
in a given year to explain variation in transplant recipient outcomes. The fixed effects are needed 
to account for unobserved differences of the quality of care that is provided at transplant centers 
in the sample. For example, if unobserved quality drives volume (as in the selective referral 
hypothesis), and volume is negatively correlated with the size of temporal breaks, then simply 
using cross-sectional variation in temporal breaks will produce biased estimates of the impact of 
temporal breaks on patient outcomes. Even after conditioning on the set of fixed effects, 
temporal breaks may not be randomly assigned, as suggested by the apparent scheduling of 
living donor transplants on particular days of the week. The use of dummy variables for specific 
temporal breaks (especially at 7, 14, 21, etc.) help mitigate the concern that the scheduling of 
living donor transplants generates biased estimates of the effects of breaks in production on 
patient outcomes. 
 As a final estimation strategy, I estimate equations 3.2 and 3.3 using the subsample of 
transplants that come from deceased donor kidneys. As figure 3.5 shows, and table 3.1 implies, 
there is little evidence that deceased donor transplants can be, or are, scheduled in any particular 
way. That is, the random arrival of kidneys from the pool of deceased donors generates 
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randomness in the size of the temporal breaks for recipients of these kidneys. Note that in this 
analysis, the size of the temporal break is defined as the number of days between a deceased 
donor transplant, and the last transplant a center performed, regardless of donor status.42 In this 
analysis, I also use a set of dummy variables to measure the size of the temporal breaks, but I 
redefine the set of dummy variables to indicate the following temporal breaks: < 4 days, 4 days, 
5-7 days, 8-14 days, 15-21 days, and > 21 days. Because there are not any spikes in the 
distribution of temporal breaks for recipients of deceased donor transplants, I remove the dummy 
variables that indicate 7, 14, and 21 days, which are used when I estimate equations 3.2 and 3.3 
on the full sample of transplants.  
The question, then, is whether temporal breaks for recipients of deceased donor 
transplants can be considered as good as randomly assigned. The nature of kidney transplantation 
suggests that they might; the arrival of a transplantable kidney from the pool of local deceased 
donors is an unanticipated event with irregular timing.43 But consider the case where a transplant 
center has multiple transplant surgeons, and these surgeons have varying levels of skills and 
expertise. Assume that a high ability surgeon typically performs a transplant, but during periods 
when the transplant center performs a relatively high number of transplants (such that the 
temporal break between transplants is short), the lower ability surgeons are called upon because 
either the high ability surgeon is unavailable, or is fatigued. In this scenario, there is non-random 
sorting of surgeons to patients that is correlated with the number of elapsed days between 
transplants, and unobserved heterogeneity in surgeon ability affects patient outcomes. In this 
                                                 
42 In other words, the temporal break measured here is not the number of days since the last deceased donor 
transplant, but rather the number of days since the last transplant, regardless of the whether the last transplant used a 
kidney from a living or a deceased donor.    
43 Later in the chapter, I explicitly test whether the observable patient, donor, and transplant characteristics of 
deceased donor transplants are correlated with temporal breaks. Evidence that observable characteristics are 
uncorrelated with the size of temporal breaks lends credibility to the assumption that unobservable determinants of 
patient outcomes are also uncorrelated with the magnitude of temporal breaks.  
114 
 
chapter, I cannot address this kind of sorting of surgeons to patients within a transplant center 
because I do not observe any surgeon identifiers. Sorting of the nature that I just described would 
make it more difficult to detect the deleterious effect of longer temporal breaks because patients 
that are transplanted after relatively short temporal breaks may be more likely to be assigned to a 
lower ability surgeon, and thus have worse outcomes. In other words, the coefficients on the 
dummy variables for longer temporal breaks will be negatively biased, since these patients are 
more likely to be operated on by a higher ability surgeon. Ultimately, the fixed effects are not 
adequate to address this potential source of bias, and I cannot practically test for non-random 
sorting of surgeons to patients without data at the surgeon level. But the bias implied by this 
scenario suggests that any effect that I do estimate is likely a lower bound of the effect of 
temporal breaks on patient outcomes.   
There are three outcomes of interest: one week, one month, and one year graft failure. 
These are measured with indicator variables, so I estimate equations 3.2 and 3.3 with linear 
probability models.44 I also cluster standard errors at the transplant center-by-year level. All 
models include the full set of patient demographic, patient clinical, and donor/transplant 
characteristics to adjust for underlying differences in the health of the patient or donor that may 
be correlated with the size of temporal breaks. To be clear, for each outcome, I estimate four 
regressions: I estimate equations 3.2 and 3.3 using the full sample, and again using the 
subsample of deceased donor kidney recipients. Using the full sample, I include dummy 
variables for temporal breaks of 7, 14, and 21 days to account for the apparent scheduling of 
living donor transplants. When I use the subsample, I use an alternative dummy variable scheme 
                                                 
44 The results are robust to using a probit model. I use the linear probability model because it generates coefficients 
that represent intuitive marginal effects.  
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since there does not appear to be heaping of observations at these specific temporal breaks for 
recipients of deceased donor kidneys. 
 
3.6 Results 
 Table 3.2 presents average patient and donor characteristics for the full sample, and also 
split by the temporal break dummy variables.45 At first blush, it appears that, on average, patient 
outcomes are better after shorter temporal breaks than after longer breaks, although an obvious 
gradient is not apparent. Part of the difficulty in detecting a gradient in patient outcomes comes 
from the relatively low rates  of graft failure that are exhibited at temporal breaks of 7, 14, and 
21 days. These lower graft failure rates correspond to the fact that the majority of transplants 
performed at these particular points in the temporal break distribution come from living donors, 
and recipients of living donor kidneys typically enjoy better outcomes than recipients of 
deceased donor kidneys. Patient and donor characteristics appear to be fairly balanced across the 
temporal break distribution, except at 7, 14, and 21 days. At these particular temporal breaks, 
recipients are slightly younger, are more likely to be white, are more likely to be privately 
insured, and are more likely to be college educated. These differences in patient characteristics 
are likely reflecting the heaping of living donor transplants at these points in the distribution.46 
Similarly, patients that receive their transplants after temporal breaks of 7, 14, or 21 days are less 
likely to be on dialysis at the time of transplant, and are less likely to be immunologically 
sensitized, suggesting that these recipients are, on average, healthier than the recipients that  
 
45 For brevity, I only report the descriptive statistics for a subset of the covariates. A “full” version of Table 3.2 is 
available from the author.  
46 The descriptive statistics presented in the first chapter confirm this relationship: recipients of living donor kidneys 
are, on average, younger, more educated, and more likely to be White and privately insured, as compared to those 
that do not opt for living donation.  
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Full Sample < 4 4 Days 5 or 6 7 8 to 13 14 15 to 20 21 22+
Number of Observations 125,125 61,176 10,743 16,076 9,399 15,332 2,683 5,310 996 3,410
Mean 5.54 1.73 4.00 5.45 7.00 10.09 14.00 17.15 21.00 25.52
St. Dev. 5.57 0.79 0.50 1.70 1.72 2.54
Mean 9.54 12.60 9.87 8.44 6.66 5.36 3.85 3.23 2.43 1.85
St. Dev. 7.20 7.81 6.27 5.39 4.16 3.39 2.28 1.99 1.41 1.14
Outcomes
Mean 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.017 0.024
St. Dev. 0.145 0.143 0.145 0.153 0.131 0.151 0.150 0.155 0.130 0.152
Mean 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.039 0.032 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.029 0.039
St. Dev. 0.187 0.185 0.190 0.193 0.176 0.196 0.189 0.186 0.168 0.193
Mean 0.091 0.091 0.093 0.093 0.077 0.093 0.083 0.093 0.092 0.094
St. Dev. 0.287 0.288 0.290 0.290 0.267 0.290 0.276 0.290 0.290 0.292
Covariates
Mean 0.380 0.355 0.370 0.395 0.638 0.314 0.601 0.296 0.551 0.326
St. Dev. 0.485 0.479 0.483 0.489 0.481 0.464 0.490 0.457 0.498 0.469
Mean 47.33 47.62 47.35 47.21 46.09 47.38 45.94 47.27 46.19 47.27
St. Dev. 13.22 13.21 13.22 13.24 13.41 13.20 12.99 13.02 12.97 13.18
Mean 0.590 0.582 0.596 0.592 0.638 0.578 0.643 0.574 0.616 0.590
St. Dev. 0.492 0.493 0.491 0.491 0.481 0.494 0.479 0.495 0.486 0.492
Mean 0.410 0.419 0.413 0.415 0.482 0.371 0.444 0.351 0.405 0.330
St. Dev. 0.492 0.493 0.492 0.493 0.500 0.483 0.497 0.477 0.491 0.470
Mean 0.353 0.342 0.356 0.355 0.393 0.358 0.384 0.355 0.376 0.363
St. Dev. 0.478 0.474 0.479 0.478 0.488 0.480 0.486 0.479 0.484 0.481
Mean 0.832 0.826 0.826 0.827 0.794 0.863 0.806 0.866 0.830 0.878
St. Dev. 0.374 0.379 0.379 0.378 0.405 0.344 0.395 0.340 0.376 0.327
Mean 0.097 0.100 0.105 0.097 0.086 0.099 0.084 0.089 0.078 0.091
St. Dev. 0.296 0.300 0.307 0.295 0.280 0.299 0.278 0.285 0.269 0.287
Mean 3.242 3.282 3.223 3.224 3.115 3.245 3.091 3.232 3.187 3.194
St. Dev. 1.810 1.810 1.823 1.816 1.768 1.815 1.783 1.821 1.755 1.828
Mean 506.6 531.6 512.0 501.6 367.2 522.3 381.9 526.1 399.8 490.7
St. Dev. 596.8 609.1 604.0 600.1 526.8 594.9 521.2 588.9 556.4 562.4
Graft Failure: One Year
Number of Days Since Last Transplant
Number of Days Since Last 
Transplant
Number of Transplants 
Performed in Last 30 Days
Graft Failure: One Week
Graft Failure: One Month
HLA Mismatches
Days Waiting
Donor: Living
Recipient White
Recipient Age
Primary Insurer: Private
College or Higher
On Dialysis
Recipient Sensitized (PRA > 
19%)
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receive their transplants at different points in the temporal break distribution. In addition, they 
are better matched to their donors immunologically (fewer HLA (antigen) mismatches) and  
spend less time waiting for their transplants. Again, these differences are likely explained by the 
heaping of living donor transplants at these particular points in the temporal break distribution. 
Table 3.2 also shows that the size of temporal breaks is negatively correlated with recent (30 
day) transplant volume, as expected. 
 Table 3.3 presents the results from the fixed effects estimations of equation 3.2. In each 
regression, I control for patient demographics, patient clinical information, and donor/transplant 
characteristics, as well as the set of transplant center-by-year dummy variables. The reference 
group in each regression is made up of patients who were transplanted after the median temporal 
break in the data (4 days). The results suggest that, all else equal, patients who are transplanted 
after below-median temporal breaks (less than 4 days) experience a lower probability of graft 
failure, as compared to the reference group, although this relationship is statistically 
insignificant. Generally speaking, it appears that patients transplanted after above-median 
temporal breaks (> 4 days) experience higher rates of graft failure than the reference group, but 
the implied gradient does not support the notion that graft failure rates increase linearly with the 
size of the temporal break. For example, patients transplanted after a temporal break of 5 or 6 
days have an increased probability of one-week graft failure of about a quarter of a percentage 
point, as compared to the reference group, although the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. 
Relative to patients transplanted after a temporal break of 5 or 6 days, the results suggest that 
patients transplanted after a temporal break of 8 to 13 days have lower rates of one-week graft 
failure, which implies that the increased temporal break actually improved outcomes (although 
the graft failure rate is still higher than in the reference group). Again, this estimate is statistically  
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         Table 3.3: Impact of Temporal Breaks on Graft Failure Rates – Full Sample 
One Week One Month One Year
Temporal Break
< 4 days -0.00044 -0.00204 -0.00209
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
5 or 6 Days 0.00232 0.00069 0.00177
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
7 Days -0.00141 -0.00104 0.00117
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
8 - 13 Days 0.00071 0.00016 -0.00448
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
14 Days 0.00326 0.00288 0.00540
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
15 - 20 Days 0.00171 -0.00552* -0.00711
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
21 Days -0.00325 -0.00724 0.00896
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
22 + Days -0.00008 -0.00345 -0.00492
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
(log) 30 Day Transplant Volume 0.00016 0.00009 0.00120
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Mean of outcome for reference group 0.022 0.038 0.093
Observations 125,125 125,125 125,125
R-squared 0.032 0.036 0.059
Notes:
1. The temporal break refers to the number of days that have elaspsed since 
the transplant center's last transplant. The reference temporal break is 4 days,
which is the median temporal break in the estimation sample.
2. Each regression controls for patient demographics, patient clinical information, 
and donor/transplant characteristics, as well as the set of transplant center-by-
year fixed effects.
3. Recent transplant center experience is captured by the natural log of
transplant center volume in the 30 days preceding each patient's transplant.
4. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant 
center-year level).
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Probability of Graft Failure Within…
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insignificant. If temporal breaks do have any negative impact on patient outcomes, then one 
would expect that graft failure rates would be higher after very long breaks, as compared to 
patients transplanted after the median temporal break. However, the coefficient on the dummy 
variable for a temporal break of at least 22 days is negative, implying these patients experience 
lower rates of one-week graft failure, as compared to the reference group. Once again, this 
estimate is statistically imprecise, but its sign is unexpected.  
 The estimates reported in table 3.3 do not indicate a statistically significant relationship 
between temporal breaks and patient outcomes. However, it may be that any effects of temporal 
breaks may be more pronounced at lower volume transplant centers, which have less 
accumulated experience to draw upon, and thus may be more likely to “forget” after longer than 
average temporal breaks between transplants. In other words, higher levels of transplant volume, 
a measure of higher general experience, may serve to protect a transplant staff from forgetting 
during temporal breaks between transplants. By estimating equation 3.3, I test whether increased 
experience, as measured by recent (30 day) volume, helps negate any deleterious effects of 
increased temporal breaks. 
 Table 3.4 presents the estimated coefficients from the model where the set of temporal 
break dummy variables are interacted with the (log of) recent transplant volume. As expected, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms are generally negative, indicating that any deleterious 
effects of temporal breaks are mitigated by higher levels of recent volume. However, the only 
statistically significant effects appear to be located at the lower end of the temporal break 
distribution. These results suggest that the effects of temporal breaks are more likely to manifest 
themselves at lower volume transplant centers, which have, on average, lower levels of 30 day 
volume. Table 3.5 presents the implied effects of temporal breaks at different points in the  
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   Table 3.4: Interaction Model – Full Sample 
One Week One Month One Year
Temporal Break
< 4 days 0.00882* 0.01076* 0.02325**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
5 or 6 Days 0.01359** 0.01364* 0.02631**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
7 Days 0.00045 0.00678 0.02514**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012)
8 - 13 Days 0.00080 0.00795 0.00644
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
14 Days 0.00457 0.00558 0.01721
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
15 - 20 Days 0.00568 -0.00099 0.00811
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
21 Days 0.00533 0.00094 0.03479**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.017)
22 + Days 0.00462 0.00582 0.01208
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
(log) 30 Day Transplant Volume 0.00259 0.00430 0.00992**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Interaction Terms
< 4 Days x  Volume -0.00432** -0.00601** -0.01191***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
5 or 6 Days x Volume -0.00559** -0.00633* -0.01195**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
7 Days x Volume -0.00042 -0.00354 -0.01192**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
8 - 13 Days x Volume 0.00110 -0.00338 -0.00359
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
14 Days x Volume 0.00099 0.00114 -0.00296
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
15 - 20 Days x Volume -0.00104 0.00030 -0.00535
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
21 Days x Volume -0.00687 -0.00311 -0.01856
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
22 + Days x Volume -0.00118 -0.00477 -0.00559
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Observations 125,125 125,125 125,125
R-squared 0.032 0.036 0.059
Notes:
1. The temporal break refers to the number of days that have elaspsed since 
the transplant center's last transplant. The reference temporal break is 4 days,
which is the median temporal break in the estimation sample.
2. Each regression controls for patient demographics, patient clinical information, 
and donor/transplant characteristics, as well as the set of transplant center-by-
year fixed effects.
3. Recent transplant center experience is captured by the natural log of
transplant center volume in the 30 days preceding each patient's transplant.
4. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant 
center-year level).
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Probability of Graft Failure Within…
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Table 3.5: Implied Marginal Effects by Percentile of Recent Volume 
10th (2) 25th (4) 50th (7) 75th (13) 90th (20)
Temporal Break
< 4 days 0.006 0.003 0.000 ‐0.002 ‐0.004
5 or 6 Days 0.010 0.006 0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003
7 Days 0.000 0.000 0.000 ‐0.001 ‐0.001
8 - 13 Days 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
14 Days 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008
15 - 20 Days 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
21 Days 0.001 ‐0.004 ‐0.008 ‐0.012 ‐0.015
22 + Days 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
10th (2) 25th (4) 50th (7) 75th (13) 90th (20)
Temporal Break
< 4 days 0.007 0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.005 ‐0.007
5 or 6 Days 0.009 0.005 0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.005
7 Days 0.004 0.002 0.000 ‐0.002 ‐0.004
8 - 13 Days 0.006 0.003 0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.002
14 Days 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009
15 - 20 Days ‐0.001 ‐0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
21 Days ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.005 ‐0.007 ‐0.008
22 + Days 0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.006 ‐0.008
10th (2) 25th (4) 50th (7) 75th (13) 90th (20)
Temporal Break
< 4 days 0.015 0.007 0.000 ‐0.007 ‐0.012
5 or 6 Days 0.018 0.010 0.003 ‐0.004 ‐0.009
7 Days 0.017 0.009 0.002 ‐0.005 ‐0.011
8 - 13 Days 0.004 0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.004
14 Days 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.008
15 - 20 Days 0.004 0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.006 ‐0.008
21 Days 0.022 0.009 ‐0.001 ‐0.013 ‐0.021
22 + Days 0.008 0.004 0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.005
Notes:
1. The numbers in parentheses in the column headers are the number of transplants
performed in the last 30 days at each point in the distribution. For example, 2
transplants in the previous 30 days is at the 10th percentile in the distribution of 30 day
volume.
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distribution of 30 day volume. After below-median temporal breaks (< 4 days), patients that are 
transplanted after below-median levels of 30 day volume experience an increase in the 
probability of graft failure, relative to the reference group. This is consistent with the idea that at 
lower-volume transplant centers, doing “too many, too soon” may lead to worse patient 
outcomes, although the mechanism through which this occurs (like transplant staff fatigue) 
cannot be identified here. As a contrast, patients that are transplanted at transplant centers 
coming off of relatively high 30 day volume experience a decrease in the probability of graft 
failure if they are transplanted after a below-median temporal break. 
 An unexpected finding is that the effect of temporal breaks does not appear to be linear in 
the size of the temporal break. In fact, the largest effects appear to be experienced by patients 
transplanted after very low 30 day volume (in the 10th percentile of 30 day volume) and after a 
temporal break of 5 or 6 days. One would expect that longer temporal breaks, such as 22 or more 
days, would have the largest effect on patient outcomes, but this notion is not supported by the 
results in table 3.5. 
 
3.7 Analysis on the Subsample of Deceased Donor Recipients 
 As discussed earlier, one of the empirical challenges in identifying the effects of temporal 
breaks on the outcomes of kidney transplant recipients is that there is clustering of living donor 
transplants at particular points in the temporal break distribution. The dummy variable scheme 
employed above partially addresses this challenge, but here I present the empirical results using 
the subsample for which temporal breaks are plausibly exogenous: deceased donor recipients. 
Table 3.6 presents evidence that temporal breaks are as good as randomly assigned for this 
subsample. I regressed each covariate on the set of temporal break dummy variables and the set  
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Table 3.6: Correlation of Temporal Breaks with Covariates – Deceased Donor Recipients 
Recipient Age 0.206 Recipient Obese 0.873 Donor Age 0.358
Recipient Female 0.521 BMI Missing 0.979 Donor: Female 0.934
Recipient Black 0.297 On Dialysis 0.518 Donor: Black 0.407
Recipient White 0.321 In Hospital 0.156 Donor: White 0.102
Recipient Hispanic 0.671 Poor Functional Status 0.813 Donor: Hispanic 0.122
Recipient Other Race 0.084 Functional Status Missing 0.601 Donor: Other Race 0.691
Primary Insurer: Medicare 0.448 Glomerular Filtration Rate (GFR) at Transplant 0.387 HLA Mismatches 0.767
Primary Insurer: Medicaid 0.078 Stage 5 Kidney Disease 0.722 Days Waiting 0.989
Primary Insurer: Private 0.937 GFR / Kidney Disease Stage Missing 0.575 Donor: Expanded Criteria 0.129
Primary Insurer: Other 0.300 Recipient Sensitized (PRA > 19%) 0.151 Donor: Local to Recipient 0.096
High School or Less 0.759 PRA Value Missing 0.087
Education Status Missing 0.237 Primary Diagnosis: Diabetes 0.641
College or Higher 0.823 Primary Diagnosis: Hypertensive Nephroscelerosis 0.799
Primary Diagnosis: Glomerular Disease 0.440
Primary Diagnosis: Polycystic Kidneys 0.360
Primary Diagnosis: Other 0.121
Primary Diagnosis: Missing 0.168
Previous Kidney Transplant 0.124
Notes:
1. Table displays the p-values to test the hypothesis that each covariate is correlated with the set of temporal break dummy variables. In 
particular, I estimated 41 separate regressions. For each, I regressed a covariate on the set of temporal break dummy variables and the set of
 transplant center-by-year fixed effects. The reported p-value corresponds to the F-statistic from each regression to test the hypothesis that
 the coefficients on the temporal break dummy variables are jointly equal to zero.
2. The regressions were estimated using the subsample of deceased donor transplant recipients (n = 77,374)
Patient Demographics Patient Clinical Information Donor / Transplant Characteritsics
 
of transplant center-by-year fixed effects. The reported p-values in table 3.6 correspond to the F-
statistic of each of these regressions. It appears that the temporal break dummy variables jointly 
have no statistical correlation with the majority of the covariates. Therefore, among the 
subsample of deceased donor recipients, temporal breaks appear to be as good as randomly 
assigned, at least with respect to observable patient, donor, and transplant characteristics. This 
finding is not surprising given the institutional setting: the arrivals of deceased donor kidneys 
from the local donor pool cannot be predicted and this randomness generates plausibly 
exogenous variation in the size of the temporal breaks experienced by the recipients of deceased 
donor kidneys.  
 Table 3.7 presents both the results of the baseline model (as in equation 3.2) and the 
interaction model (equation 3.3). Note that because there does not appear to be clustering of the  
 
 
124 
 
 
 
Table 3.7: Analysis Using Subsample of Deceased Donor Recipients 
One Week One Month One Year One Week One Month One Year
Temporal Break
< 4 days -0.00103 -0.00372 -0.00610 0.01212* 0.00983 0.02277*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
5 - 7 Days 0.00188 0.00081 0.00173 0.01243* 0.01451 0.03715**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015)
8 - 14 Days 0.00187 0.00083 -0.00653 0.00392 0.00911 0.01047
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
15 - 21 Days -0.00019 -0.00798* -0.00893 0.00375 -0.00400 0.00861
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
22 + Days 0.00087 -0.00144 -0.00345 0.00789 0.01175 0.01830
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
(log) 30 Day Transplant Volume 0.00001 0.00059 0.00135 0.00358 0.00555 0.01255**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Interaction Terms
< 4 Days x  Volume -0.00626** -0.00653* -0.01398**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
5 - 7 Days x Volume -0.00528 -0.00689 -0.01803**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
8 - 14 Days x Volume 0.00026 -0.00359 -0.00696
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
15 - 21 Days x Volume 0.00027 0.00155 -0.00531
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
22 + Days x Volume -0.00244 -0.01095 -0.00820
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Observations 77,374 77,374 77,374 77,374 77,374 77,374
R-squared 0.043 0.047 0.067 0.044 0.047 0.067
Notes:
1. The temporal break refers to the number of days that have elaspsed since the transplant center's last 
transplant. The reference temporal break is 4 days, which is the median temporal break in the sample
of deceased donor recipients
2. Each regression controls for patient demographics, patient clinical information, and donor/transplant
characteristics, as well as the set of transplant center-by-year fixed effects.
3. Recent transplant center experience is captured by the natural log of transplant center volume
 in the 30 days preceding each patient's transplant.
4. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (clustered at transplant center-year level). 
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Baseline Model Interaction Model
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data at particular points in the distribution of temporal breaks, I use a slightly different dummy 
variable scheme than I employ with the full sample. As before, the median temporal break for 
this subsample is 4 days, and the group of deceased donor transplant recipients that are 
transplanted after a 4 day temporal break serve as the reference group. The results of both 
models are generally consistent with the findings from the full sample. For example, the results 
from the baseline model are statistically insignificant, and the magnitudes of the coefficients do 
not support the expectation that longer temporal breaks generate worse patient outcomes, as 
compared to the reference group. The results from the interaction model are qualitatively similar 
to the results generated from the full sample. The coefficients on the interactions terms are 
generally negative, indicating that higher levels of recent experience mitigate any loss of 
productivity (indicated by a higher probability of graft failure) generated by temporal breaks 
between transplants at the patient’s transplant center. However, the only statistically significant 
effects manifest themselves at the lower end of the temporal break distribution. 
 
3.8 Specification Checks 
 The estimation results presented here suggest that there is a statistically insignificant 
relationship between temporal breaks between transplants and transplant center productivity, 
measured by the graft failure rates of the patients transplanted after the temporal break. I 
confirmed these findings by using different outcomes and different functional forms of temporal 
breaks. In particular, I also ran the regressions with patient mortality (also measured at one week, 
one month, and one year post-transplant) as the outcome variable. These regressions yielded 
statistically insignificant effects.  
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 In addition, I tried using various functional forms of the temporal breaks as explanatory 
variables. First, I used quadratic, cubic, and quartic terms of the number of days between 
transplants. The estimated coefficients implied the non-linear effect suggested by the dummy 
variables, but the estimated slope coefficients were statistically insignificant. These 
specifications also yielded a lower R-squared than the specifications presented above. Second, I 
used different dummy variable schemes, including using different reference groups. Each set of 
alternate temporal break dummy variables yielded similar results as the ones reported here.  
 Finally, one concern is that recent volume (measured by the log of 30 day volume) and 
the set of transplant center-by-year fixed effects account for a large percentage of the variation in 
the size of temporal breaks. If this is the case, then the temporal break dummy variables may be 
closely collinear with both recent volume and the set of fixed effects, which would generate 
inflated standard errors. As a diagnostic check, I regressed the continuous measure of temporal 
breaks (the calculated number of days since the last transplant) on the measure of recent volume 
and the set of fixed effects. The R-squared from this regression is .364, which suggests that 
collinearity is not likely the explanation for the statistically insignificant relationship between 
temporal breaks and patient outcomes.   
 
3.9 Discussion 
 The estimation results suggest that statistically there is little impact of temporal breaks on 
transplant center productivity, as measured by graft failure rates. In addition, the implied gradient 
of the effects are counterintuitive; conditional graft failure rates after relatively long temporal 
breaks (like 22 or more days) are often lower than the graft failure rates after shorter temporal 
breaks (like 5 or 6 days). These results (or “non-results”) deserve some consideration. First, there 
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may truly be no effect of temporal breaks on kidney transplant centers and their staff, and the 
estimated coefficients reflect this non-relationship. This is certainly a possibility since kidney 
transplantation is not a new procedure, and the surgical process itself has changed very little 
since 1951 (Humar and Matas 2005). In this case, the procedure may be so “familiar” that the 
temporal breaks measured here are not sufficiently long enough to allow for human capital 
depreciation or organizational forgetting. Second, there may actually be effects of temporal 
breaks on some members of the transplantation staff (or for particular aspects of the 
transplantation process) that are masked by using the transplant center as primary observational 
unit. For example, nurses that provide post-operative care for transplant recipients may 
experience depreciation of skills, but these effects are “swamped” in this analysis. Third, there 
may be non-random sorting of surgeons or staff along quality dimensions that are correlated with 
temporal breaks. As discussed earlier, lower ability staff may be utilized during periods of high 
transplant volume. This type of sorting would make it more difficult to detect deleterious effects 
of increased temporal breaks, since patients at different points in the temporal break distribution 
are exposed to different processes of care, even within the same transplant center in the same 
year. Finally, I cannot observe the activities of transplant staff members during longer temporal 
breaks. The implicit assumption of this analysis is that longer temporal breaks between 
transplants lead to organizational forgetting. But longer temporal breaks also allow the transplant 
staff to undertake training or otherwise productive activities that slow or negate skill 
depreciation. For example, staff members may attend professional conferences or simply interact 
with other transplant personnel which would lead to human capital appreciation. This kind of 
behavior may explain why conditional rates of graft failure were not as high as expected after 
relatively long temporal breaks (e.g. breaks of at least 22 days).  
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 One of practical challenges to identifying the impact of temporal breaks at an 
organizational level (i.e. at the level of the transplant center) is that many surgical procedures, 
like transplantation, are team-oriented. Temporal breaks may have heterogeneous effects on 
different members of the transplant team, but these effects cannot be identified without knowing 
the composition of each team involved with each transplant. To my knowledge, data at this level 
of detail is rare, let alone for the specific case of kidney transplantation. Even if this data were 
available, it would not inform the researcher about the activities of the transplantation team 
during temporal breaks. This issue remains as a challenge for future research in this area.  
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 This chapter addresses the question of whether temporal breaks in the production 
schedule of kidney transplant centers lead to lower productivity of the transplant center after a 
given break. The empirical evidence suggests that there is not a strong relationship between 
temporal breaks and patient outcomes. There is some evidence that higher levels of experience 
prior to a temporal break – measured by recent transplant volume – help mitigate any 
depreciation of skill or organizational forgetting that may arise from the breaks, but this 
relationship is also imprecisely estimated. The institutional setting lends credibility to the 
research design: the random arrival of transplantable kidneys at a transplant center generates 
plausibly exogenous variation in the number of elapsed days between transplants. One challenge, 
as describes above, is that living donor transplants appear to be explicitly scheduled for 
particular days of the week, which reduces some of the randomness (and variation) of temporal 
breaks. However, even using the subsample of deceased donor transplant recipients, I was unable 
to detect a statistically significant relationship between temporal breaks and transplant center 
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productivity, as measured by patient outcomes. In addition, the gradient implied by the estimated 
coefficients was unexpected and counterintuitive.  
  A key difference between this study and previous work by Hockenberry, Lien, and Chou 
(2008) and Brachet and David (2009) is that due to data limitations, I cannot address the impact 
of temporal breaks on individual worker (surgeon) productivity. Therefore, the findings of this 
chapter do not necessarily mean that there does not exist skill depreciation during temporal 
breaks for members of transplant teams, but rather that I cannot detect those effects at the 
organizational (transplant center) level. It is important to keep in mind, however, that even if I 
had surgeon level data, the fixed effects estimation cannot address the issue that I cannot observe 
surgeon activities between transplants. If surgeons, or other members of the transplant staff, are 
involved in other activities that increase human capital between transplants, then temporal breaks 
between kidney transplants may not have any detectable effect on surgeon or staff performance. 
That is, a temporal break between transplants does not necessarily indicate a temporal break in 
professional activities. This issue warrants consideration for future research in this area.  
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